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Abstract 
 
The purpose of the research has been to compare the reconciliation 
processes in South Africa and Australia.  
The research involves specific periods of human rights abuses in both 
countries.   Consideration is given to the role of state policies and institutions 
which excluded indigenous people from participating in society. Equality, 
human rights, and socio-economic disadvantage are defining elements of the 
debate between the governments and the indigenous communities. 
It is impossible to talk meaningfully about reconciliation - and the 
transformation in relationships between indigenous and non-indigenous 
people - without reference to human rights.  Both the South African and 
Australian processes were defined in terms of human rights. However, while 
there was a commitment on paper to addressing past experiences in the two 
official ‘truth telling’ mechanism introduced in both countries, the outcome of 
the processes did not, either in South Africa or in Australia, lead to any 
significant change in the unequal basis of the relationship between indigenous 
and non-indigenous people. The ways in which the processes unfolded were 
meant to offer more than a platform for memories to be recounted or for 
history to be rewritten on the basis of new evidence, they were meant to offer 
some kind of recompense that would lead to renewal and change. But neither 
the process nor the outcome properly addressed the deep disempowerment 
of  indigenous people, and in many ways the process was disillusioning. 
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In studying the reconciliation processes in these two societies, an underlying 
question presents itself: does truth really achieve reconciliation?   
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
‘The histories we trace are complex and pervasive.  The actions of the past 
resonate in the present, and will continue to do so in the future’ - Bringing 
Them Home (1997) 
 
This dissertation compares the Australian and South African truth telling 
processes and asks whether they have led to reconciliation.  The South 
African and Australian post-colonial reconciliation processes offer similarities, 
while the differences are stark.  Thus, the thesis is a first attempt at comparing 
the two processes. The thesis covers the period until the end of the Howard 
regime (1996-2007).  As a result, the most recent developments in Australia, 
where the post-Howard government, under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, 
offered and aplogy to the indigenous people in February 2008, was not 
included in this study.  In brief, it should be mentioned that although the 
Australian government offered an apology to the indigenous people who had 
suffered in the past, it fell short in not addressing the issues of compensation.  
 
Aims and Rationale 
 
The dissertation compares the processes and outcomes of the formal 
reconciliation mechanisms used in Australia and South Africa.  South Africa 
and Australia share a common history of oppressing, discriminating against, 
and violating the human rights of their indigenous populations over a long 
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period of time.  Dispossession, displacement, disappearances, genocide, 
brutality, oppressive legislation, the loss of identity, and a lack of collective 
memory characterise the history and shape the present circumstances of the 
indigenous people in both countries.  The current situation of poverty and lack 
of access to opportunities stem from the colonial past and the settlement of 
white Europeans in these regions.  After decades of struggle, the 1990s found 
both countries in a period of transition that required coming to terms with their 
respective pasts.  Supported by a growing global human rights culture, South 
Africa and Australia both developed institutions for investigating past 
violations of human rights and sought to establish ‘the truth’ of official policy 
(and subsequently attempting to write a new national history that 
acknowledged these abuses). Both processes also claimed to embark on a 
path towards reconciliation. Although the ultimate goal was similar, the 
methods and processes developed by the two countries were completely 
different. 
 
The central question is then: How do the formal reconciliation processes of 
South Africa and Australia compare? The thesis attempts to identify the larger 
issues which came into play in these countries and that have flowed from 
these formal reconciliation processes.  This is usually expressed in terms of 
an acknowledgement of human rights abuse and their symbolic recognition in 
acceptance of responsibility for these abuses. This is counterposed to a 
second form of reconciliation, known as ‘practical reconciliation’ that 
recognises material claims such as land rights and perhaps more importantly, 
the right to vote, which was tied to various social rights.   The thesis is an 
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exploratory study that will lay the ground for further comparative research that 
were both too complex and too broad to deal with in this study. While the 
following issues are mentioned, they are not subjected to a close or detailed 
analysis. These include a comparison of the ways in which indigenous people 
lost their land and how the land issue was both differently defined and 
manipulated by the colonial regimes. A comparison of the sites and forms of 
abuse suffered by victims in both societies over the longue duree and a more 
detailed study of the Australian ‘Stolen Generations’ was not possible either, 
but could form part of an extended study.  The struggle in Australia for 
apology is given short shrift in this dissertation and awaits further study. The 
issues of justice, social justice, restorative justice and reparations are issues 
that resonate in both societies and would benefit from detailed comparative 
discussion and research. The different colonial native policies in South Africa 
and Australia would offer fascinating insights into how context shaped the 
colonial state’s response to indigenous polities and how the social 
engineering that derived from discursive ideas of assimilation and self-
determination led to very different social movements and outcomes in both 
countries. These questions link to such issues as citizenship, identity 
formation and access that defined the indigenous people as secondary and 
blinded the ‘primary citizens’ from ‘knowing’ what was happening to a whole 
population through a process of social conditioning. This thesis is concerned 
with a more limited issue, which is to uncover the ways in which 
‘reconciliation’ was defined and struggled over in both countries.   
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Reconciliation had been a major issue in Australia from the 1960s, when a 
national referendum was held in 1967 to decide on whether to grant 
Aboriginal people the right to vote. This had created a new debate in Australia 
about the rights of Aboriginal people and their treatment in the past, and 
resulted in more than ninety percent of Australians voting to acknowledge 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people as citizens. This event is often 
referred to as the first stage of the reconciliation movement. The thesis 
addresses the development of the state’s response to these demands. Under 
the more liberal Labour regime, under Whitlam in 1972, a more sympathetic 
approach emerged. This was followed by a Liberal government, that back-
peddled somewhat on Aboriginal issues, which were put on the backburner. 
The issues were brought to the fore in the face of renewed activism in the 
early 1990s, coinciding with global ‘winds of democratic change’ that followed 
the fall of Soviet Russia. It was during this period of activism that new 
structures were created to address Aboriginal demands. But since the 
conservative Howard government came to power in 1996 and the mandate of 
the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation ended in 2000, reconciliation in 
Australia has taken a back seat.  The Howard government decided that under 
no circumstances would it take responsibility for past injustices against the 
aboriginal population, offer an apology, or implement any policies relating to 
reparations, land restitution, or a treaty. (Behrendt 2003: 2-16; ANTaR Media 
Releases 2000-2002; Reynolds 2000; Nettheim interview, 2003; Grattan 2000: 
88-91; Social Justice Report 2000, 2001, 2002).  In the words of Prime 
Minister Howard: ‘I do not believe that current generations of Australians 
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should formally apologise and accept responsibility for the deeds of an earlier 
generation’. 
 
The Aboriginal population, represented by various organisations, such as 
ANTaR, although divided on the details of reconciliation, insisted on including 
the above issues in any negotiations process.  However, because the 
Australian government refused to participate on those terms, the reconciliation 
process, embodied in the organisation Reconciliation Australia,  came to a 
standstill.  All parties in the reconciliation debate - apart from the government - 
seemed to believe that adopting a human rights approach was essential 
(Behrendt 2003: 2-16; ANTaR Media Releases 2000-2002; Reynolds 2000; 
Nettheim 2003; Grattan 2000: 88-91; Social Justice Report 2000, 2001, 2002).  
In this perspective, the past should be dealt with by an acknowledgement of 
the atrocities committed against indigenous people, recognition of the status 
and role of indigenous people within Australian society, giving Aborigines and 
Torres Strait Islanders their outstanding human rights, and providing some 
form of reparations.  It also meant assisting Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islanders in attaining an equal socio-economic position with all other 
Australians.   
 
The Australian government held the position that ‘formal rights’ rather than 
substantive equality was the primary issue, and that it would thus be wrong to 
give any group rights or opportunities not provided to all other citizens - even 
if such an approach would assist in uplifting indigenous people (Behrendt 
2003: 3, 9-16), (Grattan 2000: 88-91).  The government insisted on only 
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focusing on ‘practical’ issues relating to reconciliation.  Their notion of 
‘practical reconciliation’ included providing a limited amount of money for 
housing, unemployment, health, and education, believing that anything 
beyond this narrow interpretation was not their responsibility. (Behrendt 2003: 
3, 9-16)   
 
South Africa, unlike Australia, chose to deal with reconciliation by redressing 
the issue of past human rights violations as part of formal negotiations for a 
transition to democracy and a democratic constitution.  The context of the 
TRC was one in which a negotiated settlement had been made between the 
apartheid state and liberation movements that had been involved in a low-
level civil war since 1960-61. The settlement involved the repatriation of exiles, 
including a liberation army, and the integration of these forces into a 
transitional government and a new national army. The issues of human rights 
abuse were thus very complicated, because both sides had seen themselves 
to be at war and the negotiations were the equivalent of a peace settlement. 
So there were two aspects to the process of reconciliation, the one was of an 
oppressed majority and the other of specific crimes in conditions of civil war.  
So the TRC was a complex mix of an amnesty process combined with an 
outpouring of the human rights abuses experienced by the systematic 
oppression of the apartheid system. Its three pronged structure of committees 
dealing with Human Rights Violations, Reparations and Amnesty presents a 
complicated institutional process that differed dramatically from the Australian 
CAR and other structures that dealt with Aboriginal claims. Thus in South 
Africa, there was an agreed commitment to truth telling and the 
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acknowledgement of past abuses in order to deal with an especially violent 
recent past embedded in a civil war. This was not the case in Australia, where 
Aborigines had experienced an equally sustained oppression, which violated 
human rights,  but in different ways. South Africa was on the brink of an out 
and out war in 1992 that would have sparked widespread revolutionary 
violence and social dislocation. In Australia, there was never the danger of 
revolution.  The exact form of the TRC process was not determined before the 
1994 elections, but was debated afterwards.  The project was initiated by the 
establishment of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC).   
 
In both South Africa and Australia, the 1960s, a period of global economic 
upswing, saw intensified activism by indigenous people against their 
oppression.  During this period, colonial powers also relinquished control over 
their dominions across the world, including Africa.  In South Africa, liberation 
movements took up arms against the apartheid regime.  A thirty year civil war 
unfolded.   
 
Barbara Walter (2002), from the University of California - San Diego, explains 
that for a conflict to be defined as a civil war it had to: ' (1) occur within a 
generally recognized state; (2) produce at least one thousand deaths per year; 
(3) involve the national government as an active participant; and (4) 
experience effective resistance from both the rebels and the government' 
(Walter 2002). 
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In Australia the struggles of indigenous people was of a civil nature during the 
same period.  Globally, the move towards democracy in the 1990s was 
preceded in the 1980s by struggles that prompted national elites in single-
party countries to turn to ‘human rights talk’ as the hallmark of a new 
democratic order.  The incorporation of international human rights laws into a 
national constitution was seen as coterminous with democracy, freedom, and 
the creation of a new social contract with citizens (Meredith 1999).  South 
Africa and Australia developed their reconciliation processes in this context. 
 
Reconciliation virtually disappeared as a national priority in both countries by 
the end of the 1990s, even though at the beginning it was a burning issue.  
During South Africa’s first period of new democratic government from 1994 to 
1999 and the Australian ‘Decade of Reconciliation’ from 1991 to 2001, 
reconciliation was at the top of their respective national agendas.  Concepts 
like Black Economic Empowerment featured prominently in South Africa after 
1999, and arguably replaced the notion of racial reconciliation.   
 
Australia’s democracy ‘belonged’ only to the new Australians, the settlers.  It 
deliberately excluded indigenous people.  South Africa developed a refined 
form of racial exclusivism, a democracy that existed for whites only.  In South 
Africa, the popular struggles of the 1970s and 1980s mobilised hundreds of 
thousands of people against apartheid.  The Australian indigenous population 
also made their presence felt as they became more politically active.  
However, the indigenous population of Australia is very small, and their 
overwhelmingly rural existence limited their impact.   The relative population 
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size of indigenous people is an important variable in mobilising support for a 
reconciliation process.  At the time this research was conducted, Australia had 
an indigenous population of less than five-hundred thousand out of a total 
population of twenty million.  In South Africa, the black population comprised 
thirty-five million out of almost forty-five million people.   
 
In dealing with the past, in the context of a new global human rights discourse, 
countries like South Africa and Australia were faced with how a nation might 
heal the pains of the past.  How could an anti-democratic and violent 
segregationist political culture move towards true democracy and tolerance?  
How do young and emerging democracies deal with past violations of human 
rights?  How do new democratic governments deal with leaders and 
individuals who were responsible for disappearances, deaths, psychological 
and physical torture, and other human rights violations?  How does a society 
counter the effects of being raised in a system that indoctrinated and 
enshrined in them racist prejudice?  These were the questions that faced 
South Africa’s new government in 1994.  Their solution was the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.  It brought together truth telling and amnesty.  
This is discussed in the thesis. 
 
The 1991 Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
marked the start of the ‘Decade of Reconciliation’ in Australia.  This document 
led to the establishment of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, the 
publication of the Bringing Them Home report, and the Native Title debate 
(illustrated by the Mabo and Wik cases).  Australia, an ‘ordinary’ liberal 
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democracy, and not a transitional society like South Africa, faced a history of 
massive human rights violations and ‘the everydayness or bureaucratisation 
of genocide’. It faced the question of how a nation would deal with its abusive 
past.  How would Australia as a nation forge or restore its identity in the 1990s?  
The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission was asked by the 
Attorney-General of Australia in 1995 to investigate the separation and effects 
of the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their 
families between 1910 and 1970. The 1997 report, Bringing Them Home, 
received wide-spread response by ordinary Australians but was rejected by 
the new liberal government under Prime Minister John Howard. Popular pro-
aborigine marches resulted, culminating in an unofficial ‘Sorry Day’.   
 
Methodology 
 
The research for this thesis adopted a stance that recognised systems of 
domination while at the same time conceptualising marginalised groups as 
social agents who have an impact on the systems in the way they conform or 
contest and/or negotiate power relations.  The research takes reconciliation 
as a key analytical category, in a way that allows for consideration of the 
specificity of indigenous people’s experiences.  Reconciliation in divided 
societies presents a complex methodological problem.  It is hardly a 
phenomenon that can be measured in any conventional objective sense. 
Attitudes may be subjected to statistical survey, but these would still reflect 
inconclusive evidence of a scientific nature. On the other hand, although most 
analyses have tended to dwell on individual case studies, analysis of 
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reconciliation processes requires a nuanced approach that examines the 
comparative aspects of societies that have attempted national reconciliation 
processes.  Indigenous people as a social group are indeed a heterogeneous 
category, which at certain junctures might be subjected to systemic 
subordination that manifests itself in diverse and different ways.  This explains 
why in this dissertation the analysis oscillates at times between a discussion 
of developments in each country in turn.  Social change is also difficult to pin 
down, as this is an ongoing process, tied as much to the shifts that occur 
through history, regime change and the policy changes that they bring about 
as to shifts that occur through social engineering as in aboriginal oppression 
and ‘stolen generation’ or as in apartheid. An endeavour has thus been made 
in the dissertation to highlight both the positive and negative areas of change 
in both countries. 
 
In comparing the two processes, I utilised both the comparative and discourse 
analysis research paradigms.  In this instance, I found an analysis of the 
discourse relating to these two processes and their contexts to be an 
invaluable tool in the attempt at comparison. 
 
Dr. Ruth A. Palmquist, Assistant Professor at The University of Texas at 
Austin - Graduate School of Library and Information Science, explains that 
Discourse Analysis will enable one to: 
 
…reveal the hidden motivations behind a text or behind the choice of a 
particular method of research to interpret that text. Expressed in 
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today's more trendy vocabulary, Critical or Discourse Analysis is 
nothing more than a deconstructive reading and interpretation of a 
problem or text. Discourse Analysis will, thus, not provide absolute 
answers to a specific problem, but enable us to understand the 
conditions behind a specific "problem" and make us realize that the 
essence of that "problem", and its resolution, lie in its assumptions; the 
very assumptions that enable the existence of that "problem". By 
enabling us to make these assumptions explicit, Discourse Analysis 
aims at allowing us to view the "problem" from a higher stance and to 
gain a comprehensive view of the "problem" and ourselves in relation 
to that "problem". (Palmquist, R.A) 
  
The wealth of exploration by reputable scholars of the history of these two 
countries and the two processes examined in this dissertation, made 
discourse analysis a valuable tool in comparing these two societies.  
Examining the various viewpoints surrounding the contexts and fundamental 
issues underlying these two processes, added an additional comparative 
dimension to the study. 
  
The Comparative Method constitutes one of the main branches in the study of 
politics – comparing how different governments and societies manage various 
problems, with particular focus on the role and operation of political structure 
and institutional mechanisms in different contexts. When we think of the 
comparative method, we can go back as early as Aristotle, whose text, The 
Politics, written after he came to Athens in 367 BC, was one of the first to 
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explore comparative constitutions, and along with Plato’s work, heralds the 
birth of politics as a discipline. Aristotle could perhaps be considered as the 
father of the comparative method. However, in this thesis I have chosen to 
draw on several contemporary authors. 
 
Cynthia Ghorra-Gobin’s (1998) defines the comparative approach as follows:  
The comparative approach responds to concerns of an epistemological 
character. It makes it possible to classify countries and phenomena on 
the basis of a number of variables so as to then provide oneself with 
the means to deduce constants, invariables free from any historicist 
consideration. Identifying laws on the basis of these human 
phenomena and societal activities (Ghorra-Gobin 1998).  
 
In his review of comparative politics and the comparative method, Lijphart 
(1971) describes comparative politics as a subfield of political science, which 
is characterised by an empirical approach based on the comparative method.  
He explains that comparative methodology focusses on ‘the how but does not 
specify the what of the analysis’, and is thus not defined by the object of its 
study, but rather by the method it applies to study political phenomena.  
Lijphart (1971) explains that the comparative method is one of four 
fundamental scientific methods which can be used to test the validity of 
general empirical propositions, i.e. to establish empirical relationships among 
two or more variables while all other variables are held constant (Lijphart 1971: 
682–683). 
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The study does not attempt to find operable generalisations, but rather 
attempts to understand complex historical forces and effects of domination in 
different historical circumstances of two post-colonial societies – South Africa 
and Australia.  Furthermore, the study does not attempt any quantitative 
comparisons, but rather attempts to understand how societies in transition 
have dealt with their violence and violating pasts – and have attempted to 
record and possibly find mechanisms to reconcile people who were 
oppressed and excluded from civil and political rights by generations of racial 
oppressors. 
 
Rose (1991)  suggests that even though the comparative methodology makes 
use of comparable, or at least functionally equivalent units of analysis,  this 
does not suggest that the units of comparison are identical, but rather that 
they are similar in terms of specified attributes.  He also explains that the 
existence of no equivalence between the comparison of consequences does 
not prevent comparison (Rose 1991: 446-462). 
 
Rose (1991) goes on to argue  that science depends on its concepts, and that 
concepts thus come before theories. These concepts determine the questions 
that are asked as well as the resulting answers. Concepts are therefore more 
fundamental than the theories which are stated in terms of them (Rose 1991: 
446-462). 
 
Rose (1991)  suggests that it is naive to assume that political scientists 
always start by formulating abstract theories from which hypotheses are then 
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logically deduced for formal testing. Doing so has dangers, and in practice, 
the linkage of countries, concepts and theories is a matching or search 
process (Rose 1991: 446-462).  
 
This is how Rose (1991) illustrates the above: 
In comparative politics concepts are used in a manner not dissimilar to 
anatomy. The starting point is the development of a generic vocabulary 
for classifying the 'bare bones' of political systems. Concepts provide 
the categories into which information about particular countries can be 
sorted. The use of concepts does not deny the particularity of a 
national Gestalt. After all, an anatomist knows that although the bones 
of different persons can be classified under the same anatomical 
headings, it is not possible to treat each bundle of bones (each 
individual person) as identical (Rose 1991: 446-462). 
 
Rose (1991), quoting Sartori’s ‘ladder of abstraction’, suggests that concepts 
can be chosen from many rungs, depending on the purpose of the research. 
The explanation of observed differences between nations requires 
hypotheses and/or theories. Rose (1991) furthermore explains that, as long as 
concepts can be operationalized, they provide the critical link between 
empirical observations and discussions of political systems in the abstract. 
After lengthy examination of evidence of a particular country, comparative 
analysis can arrive inductively at a theoretical discussion. Rose (1991) 
provides the following examples. Firstly, ‘case studies can be surveyed in 
order to elucidate an inventory of propositions supported by available 
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empirical evidence. Alternatively, a broad theoretical discussion can be 
presented, followed by an examination of evidence of one or more countries 
that may or may not support the refutable hypotheses offered’ (Rose 1991: 
446-462). For Rose (1991), the starting point is less significant than a 
conclusion that is generalizable (Rose 1991: 446-462). 
 
This study is concerned with comparing the phenomenon of truth-telling in 
very different contexts of post-colonial history. The cases being studied 
include the Australian CAR, which was an attempt to deal with  Australia’s 
history of discrimination and oppression of its minority Aboriginal and first 
nation people and South Africa’s TRC which addressed its history of 
segregation and apartheid.  
 
Comparative social scientists recognize that a good social scientific 
explanation is relevant to a variety of cases but at the same time they 
recognize that social phenomena are complex and that a general 
explanation is a partial explanation at best. Thus, generality and 
complexity often compete with each other, even in a single study. An 
appreciation of complexity sacrifices generality; an emphasis on 
generality encourages a neglect of complexity. It is difficult to have both. 
(Ragin and Zaret 1983) 
 
In Charles Ragin’s (1987) The Comparative Method, he explores case-
oriented versus variable-oriented comparative strategies.  Ragin (1987) 
considers case-oriented methods to be classic comparative methods that 
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examin historically defined cases and phenomena. Ragin (1987) suggests 
that one of the central goals of the comparative social science is to explain 
and interpret experiences of societies nations and cultures, and that the case-
oriented strategy clearly emerges from this goal. The case-oriented strategy, 
however, is incapacitated by a large number of cases and is thus best suited 
for identifying invariant patterns common to small sets of cases. The main 
weakness identified by Ragin (1987) is this strategy’s tendency toward 
particularizing (Ragin 1987).  
 
For Ragin (1987), the variable-oriented approach is more concerned with 
assessing the correspondence between relationships across societies or 
nations and broad theoretically based images than it is with understanding 
outcomes. According to Ragin (1987), the tendency of the variable-oriented 
strategy toward abstract, and sometimes vacuous, generalizations, is its 
major weakness, and it is ‘incapacitated by complex, conjunctural causal 
arguments requiring the estimation of the effects of a large number of 
interaction terms or the division of a sample into many separate sub-samples’ 
(Ragin 1987). This strategy is ‘best suited for assessing probabilistic 
relationships between features of social structures, conceived as variables, 
over the widest possible population of observations (Ragin 1987). 
 
The case-oriented strategies aims at appreciating complexity rather than 
achieving generality. ‘Invariant statements relevant to more narrowly defined 
categories of phenomena, for example, are preferred to probabilistic 
statements relevant to broadly defined categories’ (Ragin and Zaret 1983). By 
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contrast, the variable-oriented strategies gives precedence to generality rather 
than complexity. ‘Investigators who use this approach are more interested in 
testing propositions derived from general theories than they are in unraveling 
the historical conditions that produce different historical outcomes. The case-
oriented approach uses theory to aid historical interpretation and to guide the 
identification of important causal factors; the variable-oriented strategy, by 
contrast, usually tests hypotheses derived from theory’ (Ragin and Zaret 
1983). 
 
In this dissertation, we consider the  two commissions – and those are the two 
institutions and processes that we are comparing. At the same time, we are 
comparing context (colonial history, policy towards indigenous people, post-
colonial history, demography etc.). Thus,  this is a combination of addressing 
the comparison via case studies of two post-colonial societies, and the way 
they have dealt with that post-colonial history. The so-called liberal trajectory 
of Australian politics that was particularly oppressive and exclusive towards 
indigenous society, and segregationist and apartheid South Africa (i.e from 
1910).  
 
The following variables have been identified and are explored in this 
dissertation: Colonial Conquest; Protection and Segregation; Assimilation - 
The Destruction of Indigenous Identity; Liberal Constitutionalism and the 
Struggles for Recognition; Land and its Implications; Establishment, 
Construction and Aims of the Processes; Strengths and Limitations of the 
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Processes; Government Responses to Reconciliation; International Pressure; 
Equality; Human Rights versus Practical Reconciliation. 
 
The Process 
 
The research is primarily based on the study of the reconciliation processes in 
South Africa and Australia.  The idea was to explore the differences and 
similarities within these reconciliation processes.   
 
The depth of the research varied in the two countries.  This is in view of the 
fact that in-depth studies of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission were more readily available than its Australian counterpart. 
There has been a burgeoning literature of insider views of the South African 
TRC, such that it was not necessary nor possible because of time constraints 
to undertake interviews. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the Chair of the TRC, his 
deputy Alex Boraine, and a Commissioner, Wendy Orr, have all written 
biographies that provide considerable evidence. Piers Pigou, an investigator 
in the Commission has also written about the internal dynamics in the TRC. 
The TRC report of five volumes provides an incomparable resource for 
researchers. In the case of the Australian Commission on Aboriginal 
Reconciliation, there was less written evidence, so that key informants were 
approached and gave interviews. Two research trips to Australia were used to 
gather key information on the Australian process, outcomes and context. 
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A number of different research methods were employed to adequately study 
and understand the reconciliation processes in these two countries.  First, 
unstructured interviews with a variety of actors were used.  The interview 
discussions included key informants such as officials of the commissions, 
significant scholars and representatives of key organisations who participated 
in these processes. Furthermore, open and unstructured discussions were 
used to gain information particularly on the context within which these 
processes took place, as well as the impact of these processes on the two 
countries in question. 
 
Documentary and archival research was also carried out.  Records were 
analysed, government publications and laws pertaining to the processes were 
studied to understand the scope of government powers. Newspapers, both 
local and international, were consulted.  Newspapers also constitute an 
important social space in terms of signalling change and what is considered 
crucial and newsworthy at any point in time.  
 
The timing of the visits to Australia were planned to coincide with significant 
events and publications of key reports on the impacts of these processes.   
 
Strengths and Limitations of the Thesis 
 
In considering the main question explored in this thesis, the aim is to define 
the field and consider the content and processes of the discourse of truth and 
reconciliation in the two countries, as well as to analyse the interaction 
  
 
30 
between the ‘victims’ and the state.  An important question considered in the 
dissertation is how these truth seeking and reconciliation processes compare.  
The dissertation not only addresses the various issues of reconciliation, but 
also focuses on the viability of a human rights-based versus a ‘practical 
reconciliation’ process.  It does not deal with aspects of reconciliation that 
include subjective or material objectives, the achievement of which might 
determine the success of the processes in each country.  Instead, a 
distinction is required between a formal process of holding hearings or 
researching the experiences of oppression, which might bring important 
issues to the surface, and the concept of ‘reconciliation’, which refers to a 
coming to terms with past trauma and a choice to move forward collectively.  
The latter cannot be dealt with in this study.   
 
The literature lacks a practical definition or articulation of the meaning of 
‘reconciliation’.  In fact, its meaning is largely dependent on context.  The 
original notions of ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation’ held at the beginning of the South 
African and Australian experiences differed substantially from how it was 
understood a decade later.  It should be noted that the exposure or 
presentation of truth does not automatically lead to reconciliation.  
 
The issues raised by a comparison of the South African and Australian truth 
and reconciliation processes invites a whole range of potential elaboration 
and discussion that simply cannot fit within the scope of a Master’s 
dissertation.  As such, this study is limited to a preliminary investigation of the 
research and literature on the South African TRC and the Australian 
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reconciliation processes.  Its originality lies in its comparative approach, 
something only a few scholars, such as Orford (2005), have attempted to 
employ.   
 
Obstacles to Overcome 
 
Much research has been undertaken on the reconciliation processes in 
Australia and South Africa.  After completing an extensive search, as well as 
consulting with the Australian High Commission, I discovered that the 
research material on Australia available in South Africa was minimal, outdated, 
and mostly related to general history.  Secondary sources about the 
Australian reconciliation process, as well as literature on the Aboriginal 
struggle, were almost non-existent in South Africa.  Thus, in July and August 
2003 and June 2004, I undertook research trips to Australia.  My research 
trips to Australia gave me great insight into the social relations between the 
indigenous people and the rest of the population in that country.  I had initially 
believed that Australia’s economic development and ranking among the top 
first-world countries would have enabled a successful reconciliation process 
and the integration of the indigenous population with non-indigenous 
Australians. What I found in 2003, twelve years after the process began in 
Australia, was very different and not much had changed on my return in 2004.  
I have not attempted to pursue the story beyond this period. Thus it is 
important to acknowledge that changes have occurred since, particularly in 
early 2008. This post-script has not been integrated into this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2: FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS DEFINED 
 
It is important to begin the discussion about the reconciliation processes in 
South Africa and Australia by defining some of the fundamental concepts 
upon which these processes are based. Defining the concepts of Truth 
Commissions and Reconciliation forms a platform on which to base the 
discussion on the establishment, construction and aims of the processes 
chosen in these two countries, which is dealt with in Chapter 4.  
 
Truth Commissions 
 
Humphrey (2002) and Orford (2005) are two scholars who have conducted 
extensive research in the field of truth commissions.  As their explanations of 
these key concepts correlate strongly with the Australian and South African 
situations, I decided to draw extensively on their definitions of these terms. 
 
Orford (2005) believes that most of the literature regarding truth commissions 
focus on the success of these commissions in achieving reconciliation, peace, 
justice or successful transitions to democracy.  Truth commissions attempt to 
report on massive human rights violations in liberal democratic states as well 
as the bureaucratisation of genocide.  Unsettling the sense that massive 
human rights violations are an exceptional problem confronting states in 
transition from authoritarianism or dictatorship to democracy and truth forms 
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the fundamental basis in establishing transitional justice institutions (Orford 
2005: 2).   
 
Humphrey (2002) notes that truth commissions have been adopted 
internationally to promote national renewal and foster inclusive societies in the 
wake of state repression and violence.  The centrepiece of the truth 
commission process is individual testimonies of suffering.  Truth commissions 
address the legacy of violence – trauma – as the basis for promoting national 
reconciliation rather than the pursuit of justice through the prosecution of its 
perpetrators (Humphrey 2002: 106).   
 
Christie (2000) argues that truth commissions are a society’s best hope for 
restoring meaning in individual lives, and can assist in determining how the 
effects of a traumatic past are linked to the present (Christie 2000).  Trials or 
truth commissions are designed in part to help change the practices of 
authoritarianism to democracy, although these attempts are inevitably shaped 
by the past as well.  Truth commissions also provide a frame of reference for 
future historians who wish to analyse the politics of states in transition.  
Wilson (2001) concurs with these arguments, noting that human rights 
commissions create a space where stories of suffering can emerge and be 
incorporated into the ‘official’ version of the past (Wilson 2001). 
 
Orford (2005) explains that transitional justice literature treats the recording of 
truth as necessary for commencing the healing of individuals and of the 
community  (Orford 2005: 2).  
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In analysing post-conflict societies, Humphrey (2002) suggests that the 
problems faced in reconstructing nationally fractured communities often 
dictate whether to pursue reconciliation.  Usually, the state – or the new 
political regime – is not strong enough to pursue the path of justice, a point 
proven by the repeated need for international criminal tribunals to prosecute 
crimes against humanity or other atrocities (Humphrey 2002: 105). 
 
Orford (2005) states that the goal of facilitating healing for individuals requires 
accepting their testimony as the truth.   
For example, the processes of the South African TRC were designed 
to enable victims to feel safe while they told their stories before 
sympathetic listeners and to assist in documenting atrocities and 
locating individual trauma in the larger political context.  In the context 
of a history in which the state and its legal institutions were the 
purveyors of terror and human rights abuses, this requires a distancing 
of the TRC from the legacy of apartheid law. The Human Rights 
Committee of the TRC particularly avoided giving chilling reminders to 
victimised people of the hostility and insensitivity of the courts under 
apartheid (Orford 2005: 3, 4). 
 
Humphrey (2002) argues that the notion of reconciliation is politically focused 
on the social recovery of victims within the larger purpose of reconstituting the 
national whole. In this process, he explains, ‘the threshold of moral vision is 
adjusted by recognising victims in the testimony of their suffering’ (Humphrey 
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2002: 106). Truth commissions seek to ‘invert the state politics of pain by 
shifting the focus from terror to trauma’ (Humphrey 2002: 106). With pain as 
their fulcrum, they seek to objectify and institutionalise truth claims through 
the testimony of victims.  However, the political shift from terror to trauma 
results in an implied difference in the perspective of pain (Humphrey 2002: 
106).  In the former, pain is ‘the medium through which society established its 
ownership over individuals’, while in the latter, ‘pain is the medium available to 
an individual through which a historical wrong done to a person can be 
represented, taking sometimes the form of describing individual symptoms 
and at other times the form of a memory inscribed on the body’ (Humphrey 
2002: 106).  
 
In contrast to the evidence available to courts, truth commissions are able to 
draw on a broader range of evidentiary material and are able to widen the 
focus of their inquiries from the actions of particular individuals to the role of 
entire sectors of society (Orford 2005: 3). 
 
The sources of ‘truth’ (evidence) are the stories of the suffering of the victims 
without the burden of legal proof or judgements.  According to Humphrey 
(2002), individual testimonies also serve as alternative sources of ‘memory’ 
for events that had been expunged from official records.  The power of these 
statements is not legal (at least only potentially and indirectly), but empathetic.  
The process is supposed to move people collectively, thereby diminishing the 
legacy of violence by sharing its effects.  This sharing of the ‘truth’ of suffering 
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is an act of moral implication that is supposed to engender acknowledgement 
of collective responsibility (Humphrey 2002: 106). 
 
In the courts, violence is re-enacted in precise detail through rules of evidence 
and procedure to establish the ‘fact’ of its occurrence for the purpose of 
judgement and punishment.  In tribunals, ‘truth’ is established through the 
credibility of the performance of the victim in telling their story and the 
empathy witnesses feel.  Testimonies to suffering before tribunals are not 
aimed at securing justice; instead, they utilise the victim as the foundation for 
moral and social reconstruction (Humphrey 2002: 107).   In Australia and 
South Africa, the processes were both painful, deeply cathartic but also with a 
strong political and material aspect to them.  
 
Humphrey (2002) argues that in tribunals the greatest burden falls on the 
survivor: they are enjoined to reveal the constituted collective memory; and 
they are morally pressured to reconcile and forgive, and to accept token 
compensation (if any).  Finally, the victim’s rights are further subordinated to 
the promise of the rule of law and notions that a more pervasive culture of 
human rights may be established (Humphrey 2002: 141).  
 
The most commonly expressed criticism of the role played by war crimes 
tribunals and truth commissions is the extent to which they are capable of 
producing an agreed ‘truth’ or collective memory.   
 
  
 
37 
While supporters of truth commissions see in this flexibility a strength, 
for others (and particularly those in political opposition to the new 
regime), the lack of traditional process detracts from the credibility of 
the truth produced as a result (Orford 2005: 5). 
 
Truth commissions offer the means to respond to years of barbarism run 
rampant, or horrific human rights violations that occurred while countries were 
caught up in racial, ethnic, class, and ideological conflict over justice and 
power (Orford 2005: 6). 
 
Another strand of critical engagement with the work of transitional 
justice focuses on the performative effects of war crimes trials or truth 
commissions, and in particular on the ability to achieve the ends 
claimed for them – individual healing, collective reconciliation, the 
recording of history.  In the context of South Africa, for example, some 
commentators have argued that the TRC increased racial tensions.  
Many commentators (including it should be noted the authors of many 
truth commission reports) point out that reconciliation depends as 
much upon ending the threat of further violence, addressing structural 
inequalities and providing reparation as it does upon the 
acknowledgement of the truth (Orford 2005: 7, 8).  
   
Others who are concerned with individual healing suggest that there is 
no reason to think that the experience of testifying before such a 
commission will necessarily have a therapeutic effect.  A number of 
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commentators noted that these inquiries are hardly a healing process 
for those actually responsible for seeking out the truth’ (Orford 2005: 7, 
8).  
 
Although acknowledging the value of some of the work of truth commissions, 
Wilson (2001) suggests that these methods of investigation and 
documentation are too legalistic to adequately record and reflect upon past 
violations.  Citing the South African TRC, he also believes that truth 
commissions do not function well if they are overloaded with a variety of tasks.  
According to Wilson (2001), the most damaging outcome of truth 
commissions is their inherent equating of human rights with reconciliation and 
amnesty, which he says de-legitimises them in relation to popular 
understandings of justice, and can lead to greater criminal activity in society.  
Finally, Wilson (2001) says that human rights talk has become the language 
of pragmatic political compromise rather than the language of principle and 
accountability.  He argues that this is the main obstacle to popular acceptance 
of human rights as the new ideology of constitutional states (Wilson 2001: 
228).  
 
Political crimes are usually committed by highly skilled operatives trained to 
conceal their acts and destroy incriminating evidence; thus, these offences 
are notoriously difficult to prosecute and to establish guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt.  For example, the Nuremburg trials after World War II were extremely 
time-consuming, expensive, and required large teams of skilled and highly 
competent investigators. Moreover, judicial enquiries into politically sensitive 
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matters rarely satisfy the need for truth and closure.  As such, they should not 
necessarily be seen as superior alternatives to bodies such as the TRC. 
 
Reconciliation 
 
As  mentioned in the previous chapter, the literature lacks a practical definition 
or articulation of the meaning of ‘reconciliation’.  Its meaning is thus largely 
dependent on context. Numerous definitions of reconciliation have, however, 
emerged from the South African and Australian reconciliation processes.   
 
According to the Collins Dictionary, ‘reconciliation’ means to bring opponents 
into a friendly relationship, to come to a settlement, or to acquiesce to 
unpleasantness (Collins, 4th edition, 1999).  In practice, the meaning of 
reconciliation varies according to the situation or national context. For 
analytical purposes, Lederach (1997) -  a Mennonite conciliator who has been 
involved in peace processes in many countries - provides an interesting and 
appropriate definition of reconciliation.  He illustrates the idea of relationship 
as ‘the basis of the conflict and its long-term resolution’ (Lederach 1997: 26). 
The idea of ongoing ‘encounters’ not a once-off event is at the core of the idea 
and the practice. It involves knowing and acknowledging, argues Lederach 
(1997), in order for a more interdependent and creative process of peace-
building and interaction. For Lederach (1997), the space of reconciliation is 
critical – it must include and involve a four-pronged process which he sees as 
a framework – he has a graphic which shows reconciliation in the middle with 
four prongs representing the process of Truth (acknowledgement, 
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transparency, revelation and clarity), Mercy (acceptance, forgiveness, support, 
compassion, healing), Justice (equality, right relationships, making things right, 
restitution) and Peace (harmony, unity, well-being, security, respect). He goes 
on to discuss how the relationships involved in reconciliation are embedded in 
three specific contradictory ‘paradoxes’: ‘a conflictual past and an 
interdependent future; a space for truth and mercy to meet where concerns 
for exposing what has happened and for letting go in favor of renewed 
relationships that are validated and embraced’. Finally, ‘redressing the wrong 
is held together with the envisioning of a common connected future’ 
(Lederach, 1997: 31). This is clearly a challenging model, because 
contradiction can lead to impasse – instead he proposes a process of 
embracing the paradoxes in order to move forward constructively. His book 
addresses the ‘how to’ of reconciliation – but it is an interesting contrast to 
conflict resolution – a process which he calls ‘conflict transformation’.  
 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission determined that 
reconciliation was not about avoiding the reality of history or pretending that 
events of the past had not occurred.  It acknowledged that reconciliation 
would likely be never-ending, costly, and often painful.  In South Africa, 
establishing democracy and a human rights culture were essential elements 
of the reconciliation process, with the hope that such changes would foster a 
more decent, caring and just society (TRC Report 1998: 349).   
 
The Australian notion of reconciliation focused on recognition, rights, and 
reform.  Ideally, this requires an acknowledgment that indigenous people have 
  
 
41 
a historical and cultural relationship to the land that should define their rights 
as ‘first peoples’ within the larger society of Australia.  Reconciliation was also 
supposed to be about reforming the existing system to address the 
disadvantages experienced by indigenous people and to change how those 
people are viewed in society (Grattan 2000: 68).  
 
Fanie Du Toit (2003), an Afrikaner and South African political philosopher, 
contends that reconciliation is based on respect for a common humanity, and 
involves a form of restorative justice that does not seek revenge or impunity.  
Equally important is the necessity of perpetrators to accept responsibility for 
past abuses.  This is not intended to wipe away the past, but rather to stress 
remembrance without debilitating pain, bitterness, revenge, fear, or guilt.  In 
this respect, reconciliation seeks to learn from and redress past violations for 
the sake of a shared present and a peaceful future.  While it does not require 
forgiveness, there must be a general willingness to peacefully co-exist and 
resolve continuing differences.  Reconciliation also requires all citizens to 
accept a moral and political responsibility to nurture and protect a culture of 
human rights and democracy, as well as a commitment to resolve political and 
socio-economic conflicts in a non-violent manner.  At best, reconciliation is a 
continual process that gradually addresses the issues and problems that 
cause divisiveness and generate conflict (Du Toit 2003: 26).  
 
For the Australian government, reconciliation involved implementing practical 
measures to achieve improvements in the livelihoods of indigenous people 
(Social Justice Report 2000: 2).  Grattan (2000) views reconciliation as a 
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process that takes place at different levels.  At the personal level, ignorance, 
hostility, discrimination, or racism would damage reconciliation, while concern, 
solidarity, inclusiveness, and respect would lead to a positive result (Grattan 
2000: 265).  At the social level, reconciliation involves resolving continuing 
problems in health, housing, education, employment, welfare, and economic 
advantage that are experienced by indigenous people.  In this respect, 
reconciliation is explicitly linked to whether the government and people of 
Australia are committed to addressing the concerns of Aboriginal people.  
Ultimately, it is about acknowledging the shared responsibilities and 
obligations that a society has towards those who have been oppressed 
(Grattan 2000: 265). 
 
The Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) 
Social Justice Report 2000 outlines a rights framework for reconciliation 
based on four inter-related principles.  The first is ‘No discrimination’ or 
guaranteed equal treatment and protection for all.  The definition they provide 
goes as far as recognising the cultural distinctiveness of indigenous people 
and the adoption of special measures to redress historically derived 
disadvantage.  The second is ‘progressive realisation’, which refers to the 
commitment of sufficient resources through well-targeted programs to ensure 
adequate progress in the realisation of rights on a non-discriminatory basis.  
The third is ‘effective participation’ to guarantee the participation of indigenous 
people in decisions that affect them, including in the design and delivery of 
programs.  Finally, ‘effective remedies’ provides mechanisms for redress 
where human rights are violated (Social Justice Report 2001: 193). 
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The South African context was of a newly formed democratic government 
trying to create an inclusive human rights environment where none had 
previously existed.  In contrast, the Australian process was defined by a need 
to change governance methods through legislative measures that could 
shape the opportunities and outcomes of the disadvantaged (Grattan 2000: 
265). 
 
Humphrey (2002) notes that South Africa’s TRC was primarily concerned with 
providing the victims of gross human rights violations with ‘space’ to tell their 
stories, incorporating their experiences into the history and public 
consciousness of the country.  In this respect, reconciliation was both 
symbolic and political.  In Australia, reconciliation was equated with 
recognition for Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders.  Apart from finally 
acknowledging the history of oppression and violence in the country, 
reconciliation was supposed to provide recognition of indigenous people as 
the original citizens of the country (Grattan 2000: 266). 
 
Terminology 
 
When speaking of the formal or official reconciliation process, this dissertation 
refers to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC or the 
Commission), or Australia’s Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR or the 
Council) and Reconciliation Australia. 
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For the purposes of this dissertation, the term ‘indigenous people’ refers to 
Australia’s Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders. In the literature, indigenous 
people are refered to as aborigines, aboriginals, aboriginal natives, natives, or 
black.  South Africa’s black population is also refered to as Africans or natives. 
Coloured, Indian, black and white refer to categories that defined groups in 
South Africa under the Population Registration Act (1950).  Australia’s white 
population is often referred to as Europeans, settlers or non-indigenous 
people in the literature.  
Aboriginal people are also described as full-blood or half-blood (mixed race). 
Terra nullius is defined as land belonging to no-one. 
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CHAPTER 3: LEGACIES OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN AUSTRALIA 
AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
In South Africa and Australia, the reconciliation processes focussed on 
specific periods of human rights abuses in their countries. I will illustrate in this 
chapter, however, that there was a long pre-history. The terms of reference 
limited both processes to specific periods, neither of which dealt with the 
colonial past.  It is thus important to take a steep back in this chapter to eplore 
some defining moments of exclusion for both indigenous societies. In South 
Africa it was probably the South African Union of 1910, and the Land Acts, 
with issues of labour segregation and the entrenchment of migrancy. In 
Australia, this was illustrated by the removal of Aboriginal children from their 
families, Native Title, the questions relating to treaty. 
Variables explored in this chapter include: Colonial Conquest; Protection and 
Segregation; Assimilation - The Destruction of Indigenous Identity; Liberal 
Constitutionalism and the Struggles for Recognition; and, Land and its 
Implications. 
 
Colonial Conquest 
The oppression of indigenous people in Australia and South Africa occurred in 
different ways, at different times, and in different contexts.  Although both 
nations were colonised by Britain and the indigenous people were dominated 
and oppressed by developing settler societies, fundamental differences exist 
  
 
46 
between the experiences of the two countries.  In this section, I focus on 
some of the similarities as well as differences of colonial conquest between 
Australia and South Africa.  These include issues such as forced integration 
into wage labour, maintenance of homestead and family life and subordination 
of the indigenous people. 
European incursion into the way of life of indigenous people in Australia 
began upon settlement of this country in 1788.  For Aboriginal Australians it 
became important to retain and protect their traditional way of life including 
their culture, values, institutions and land (Stokes 2002: 191,192).  European 
settlement in Australia was characterised by violence, oppression and 
segregation as well as the annexation of traditional Aboriginal land.  The 
frontier conflict in Australia also resonates with the South African experience, 
where commandoes in the earlier century were established to perform raids 
on San-Bushmen.   
The abduction and capture of indigenous people in both these countries was 
primarily for the purpose of pressuring them into labour.  This defeat and 
dispossession of indigenous communities would affirm the supremacy of the 
settlers and established a condition akin to slavery (Reynolds 1987: 68).  
Colonialism in both these countries depended on the use and abuse of labour 
resources of the indigenous communities.  In South Africa, independent 
African producers were unable to sustain long term production as a result of 
‘settler competition, land losses and legislative and administrative controls 
designed by the colonial state to force them into wage labour’ (Walker 1982: 
174).  In the Australian situation, the forceful removal of Aborigines into 
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pastoral stations, fringe camps, reserves and missions were designed for 
exactly this purpose (Reynolds 1987: 67).  They were designed as a form of 
control over the traditional Aboriginal way of life, to control freedom of 
movement and to force indigenous people into labour.  This restriction of 
movement was reflected in South African pass laws.   
In South Africa, by the end of the 19th century, ‘all formerly independent 
chiefdoms had been brought under colonial administration systems through 
direct conquest, annexation, or negotiated settlement’ (Walker 1982: 174).  In 
Australia there was never any form of peace treaty or formal negotiations 
regarding settlement (Reynolds 1992: 198).  Passes and other mechanisms of 
labour control – service contracts, curfew regulations, residence controls, and 
travel permits – ensured that labour took the form of migrant labour. In South 
Africa the hut tax (1820s) was a central device for drawing the homestead into 
the nexus of the cash economy.  The hut tax created a new and inflexible 
demand for cash in African societies, and while some homesteads were able 
to meet it through increased market production, an increasing number were 
obliged to turn to wage labour (Walker 1982: 174,175).  This is in contrast to 
the Australian situation where indigenous people were formerly hunter 
gatherers. The new dispensation limited their freedom to live a traditional way 
of life particularly in relation to the land.  
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Protection and Segregation 
 
Colonialism brought European settlement to South Africa in a slower and 
more complex process than in Australia.  Racial segregation and state 
controlled processes were entrenched by the time of Union in South Africa in 
1910.  The gradual systemisation of segregation and racist social engineering 
achieved dominance in 1948 through settlement patterns and enforced racial 
domination, i.e. apartheid. Australian history was also characterised by 
entrenched racism, however, South Africa’s systematic racial ordering of 
society and its consequent violation of human rights occurred on an entirely 
different scale. 
In Australia this racial ordering comprised a set of ‘total institutions’, 
distinguished by the autocratic rule of officials or mission employees.  For 
decades, the institutional regimes governing indigenous people in Australia 
were largely unaccountable and the State Protection Boards played an 
authoritarian and often brutal role in restricting Aboriginal society (Stokes 
2002: 192, 193). 
State policies and institutions in Australia excluded indigenous people from 
participating in Australia’s liberal democracy.  Through official protection and 
segregation policies Aborigines were denied citizenship rights and 
institutionally confined to state reserves (Stokes 2002: 193).  To maintain 
order, state laws established new categories of offences only applicable to 
indigenous people.  These included: ‘drinking, leaving a reserve, entering one 
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when barred, intermarrying, refusing to work, being cheeky, writing salacious 
letters to a boy/girl-friend, committing adultery, playing cards’.  When found 
guilty of such offences a range of penalties were imposed such as ‘fines, 
forced manual labour, confinement, or expulsion from the community’. (Stokes 
2002: 193, 194).  
In South Africa, after the Union in 1910, a set of ‘native policies’ were put in 
place to establish control.  Ultimately, this legislation entrenched a system 
which was dependent on single male migrant labour.  Some of the important 
legal measures adopted included the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911, 
the Land Act of 1913, which set the parameters of the South African reserves 
and sounded the death knell for independent African peasant producers. The 
Urban Areas Act of 1923 introduced a uniform system of urban pass controls 
and a segregated urban housing policy.  Finally, the Native Administration Act 
of 1927 made it clear that the all-white government intended to base its native 
policy on a reconstructed ‘traditionalism’, with the purpose of shoring up 
homestead production and adapting tribalism into a ‘bulwark against radical 
movements’.  In addition, existing tribal chiefs were ‘co-opted as lowly 
functionaries of the state, customary law was recognised in civil cases 
between Africans, and tribal marriage was sanctioned.  By 1930, the migrant 
labour system had become the dominant force in the social and economic life 
of the rural periphery of southern Africa’. (Walker 1990: 176).  
According to William Beinart (2001), South Africa rejected an all-embracing 
form of nationalism, and instead enshrined racial distinctions at the heart of its 
legislative program and political projects.  In 1948, a ‘reunited’ National Party 
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(NP) sought a tight set of racial policies (Beinart 2001: 143).  The Mixed 
Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality Act (1950) prohibited marriage and 
extramarital sex across racial boundaries (Beinart 2001: 147).  In 1950, the 
Population Registration Act (1950) provided for compulsory racial 
classification on a national register (Beinart 2001: 148).  The Group Areas Act 
(1950) and Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (1951) defined living areas by 
racial zones (Beinart 2001: 153).  The government also greatly impeded 
radical worker organisation through the Suppression of Communism Act 
(1950) (Beinart 2001: 155).  The Urban Areas Act of 1952 was one of a 
number of regulations passed concerning African movements and urban 
rights (Beinart 2001: 158).  The Prohibition of Improper Political Interference 
Act (1967) outlawed most political activity across racial lines (Beinart 2001: 
151).  As a result, opposition movements inside and outside the country 
focussed on issues such as passes, influx control, and forced removals, as 
well as provided an interface between black and white women (Beinart 2001: 
189).   
 
For Beinart (2001), the NP’s apartheid edifice, which drew on segregationist 
precedents, rested on several pillars: a starker definition of race, exclusive 
white participation and control of central political institutions (and repression of 
those who challenged this), separate institutions or territories for blacks, racial 
segregation in towns and the countryside, control of African movement to 
cities, tighter division in the labour market, and the segregation of amenities 
and facilities of all kinds, from universities to park benches (Beinart 2001: 148). 
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In the Australian situation, Aborigines were placed in two major categories, 
‘the so-called “full-bloods” or tribal Aborigines, and those of mixed race’ 
(Stokes 2002: 193).  Two different policies were applied, based on the 
putative condition or capacities of these two categories of indigenous people, 
namely either segregation or assimilation.  For tribal Aborigines, segregation 
was intended to protect them during the ‘time it took the race to die out’ 
(Stokes 2002: 193).  ‘For both the “full-blood” Aborigines and those of mixed 
race, the policy was one of hastening the inevitable demise of race and 
culture.  On such grounds, some would argue, these programs were attempts 
to bring about the ultimate exclusion of indigenous people, namely, their 
genocide’ (Stokes 2002: 193). 
The international legal definition of the crime of genocide is found in Articles II 
and III of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide. Article II describes two elements of the crime of genocide: 
1) the mental element, meaning the ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’, and  
2) the physical element which includes five acts described in sections a, b, c, 
d and e. A crime must include both elements to be called ‘genocide’.  
Article III described five punishable forms of the crime of genocide: genocide; 
conspiracy, incitement, attempt and complicity.  
Reynolds (1987) explains the concept of genocide in the Australian context as 
follows: 
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Did significant numbers of settlers seek the total destruction of 
Aboriginal Australia?  It is clear that from at least the 1820s many 
colonists expected the Aborigines to “die out” or “pass away”.  The 
belief grew stronger as the century progressed and was still widely held 
in the 1940s.  Australians often talked of extinction and extermination, 
but their reaction to the prospect varied widely.  Sharpened conflict 
called forth increased demands for extermination.  They became 
common, for perhaps the first time, between 1828 and 1830.  Even 
when the fighting ceased and anxiety ebbed there were settlers who 
believed that colonisation was incomplete while any blacks were alive. 
(Reynolds 1987: 53-57) 
Under these circumstances, citizenship for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islanders was primarily a minimal legal and administrative category that 
enabled state governments to implement policies that were almost universally 
authoritarian, discriminatory and oppressive.  Aborigines were forbidden to 
speak their native languages, and their previous cultural practices were 
prohibited.  The state aimed to reduce indigenous ‘sovereignty’ over important 
areas of life, constrain the autonomy of those living within it (Stokes 2002: 
194).  Few political options were available to Aborigines under this regime, 
apart from escape, withdrawal or resistance (Stokes 2002: 195).  When 
combined with government neglect of basic service provision, these factors 
contributed to a self-perpetuating cycle of poverty and despair that limited the 
capacity to engage effectively in liberal democratic political struggles (Stokes 
2002: 195,196).  
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The Aborigines were the subjects of policy, of a particular kind of ‘integration’ 
based on paternalism, protectionism, and later assimilation. To embrace this 
new lifestyle, they were still subject to unequal treatment, evidenced by low 
income, special laws of removal from their lands, citizenship cards (the 
equivalent of South African passes), and even eradication campaigns.   
The second destructive policy identified by Bourke et al (2002) was the 
forcible removal of indigenous children from their families from 1910 to 1970.  
This measure was part of a social engineering experiment designed to ‘breed 
out’ the Aboriginal race, and subsequently became the preferred solution to 
the ‘half-cast problem’ in Australia (Social Justice Report 2000). 
 
Assimilation - The Destruction of Indigenous Identity 
 
From 1937 to 1972, assimilation was the primary Aboriginal policy for the 
various Australian governments and political parties of the period. In a 
comparable period, South Africa espoused segregation, and after 1948, the 
idea of separate development, or apartheid, as it came to be known.   
The central goal of this policy of assimilation in Australia is clearly 
demonstrated by a statement made at a ministerial meeting in 1961: ‘The 
policy of assimilation means in the view of all Australian governments that all 
aborigines and part-aborigines are expected eventually to attain the same 
manner of living as other Australians and to live as members of a single 
Australian community’ (Native Welfare Conference, 1961). 
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Those of mixed race were thought minimally capable of participating in white 
society and many of them were subjected to a policy of forced assimilation.  
The main strategy was to remove such children from indigenous families and 
place them in state institutions and white families so that they could learn to 
participate in the larger white society and economy.  Over time, however, it 
was also thought and hoped that all trace of ‘colour’ would be bred out 
(Stokes 2002: 193). 
Bourke et al (2002) suggest that the impact of genocide, invasion, 
institutionalisation, and the forced assimilation of the indigenous population 
only began to be generally recognised in the non-Aboriginal community in the 
1960s.  As mentioned earlier, this was a period of global economic upswing, 
and saw intensified activism by indigenous people against their oppression.  
During this period, colonial powers also relinquished control over their 
dominions across the world. 
 
Liberal Constitutionalism and the Struggles for Recognition 
 
The formation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 constituted the 
creation of a new federal, political domain, comprising formal constitution, 
liberal democratic institutions, values and practices.  Building upon colonial 
democratic precedents, this national domain of liberal democracy, as Stokes 
(2002) puts it, put a premium on political equality among citizens.  Ideally, it 
consisted of instruments for (a) protecting the legal and political rights of 
individuals, such as the common law, the constitution, and legal statute, and 
(b) selecting governments that have authority over citizens, which is then 
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exercised through the instruments of the state.  In Australia, the federal 
system also ensured that sovereignty was divided between the 
Commonwealth and the states (Stokes 2002: 187). Through Section 51 (xxvi), 
the original constitution prohibited the Commonwealth from making special 
laws for ‘aboriginal natives’ and effectively left power over indigenous people 
with the states.  In addition, the states, through their ‘residual powers’, were 
awarded constitutional jurisdiction over land.  This fact and the condition of 
divided sovereignty had a significant influence upon the evolution of relations 
between indigenous people and the state, largely to the detriment of the 
former (Stokes 2002: 187). 
 
Following colonial precedents, early in the history of the Australian 
Commonwealth, only certain kinds of people, usually ‘whites’, were deemed to 
have the capacities for democratic citizenship.  As a consequence of later 
political struggles, however, this liberal democratic political domain gradually 
expanded the types of people who could be officially designated as citizens 
(Chinese, Aborigines).  Such a process may be categorised as one of liberal 
inclusion, in which previously excluded groups are given entry into liberal 
democratic institutions, and then begin to participate in them.  This process of 
inclusion involved not only the granting of votes, but often also legal rights and 
other institutional and material resources (Stokes 2002: 188). 
 
For indigenous people, the logic of inclusion tends to produce particular 
political and social outcomes.  The general citizenship regime for Aborigines 
and Torres Strait Islanders remains a liberal democratic one that is little 
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different from that of the rest of the society.  This process of liberal inclusion 
required the political assimilation of indigenous people into the prevailing 
values and practices of Australian citizenship.  Indeed, one tendency, 
associated with the interests of the liberal democratic state, was to 
incorporate the newly included groups and remould them into compliant civic 
actors.  The political disposition here, Stokes (2002) argues, was still to 
reshape the indigenous domain and make it conform better to established 
forms of political and administrative rationality. Regimes of consultation and 
indigenous self-management were characteristic of this political logic (Stokes 
2002: 189).  In South Africa the discourse was much more distinctively 
segregationist.   
Aboriginal people lack the population numbers necessary to influence political 
parties, or the financial resources to educate the wider community about their 
concerns through television, radio, or the print media. And yet there has been 
intense public interest at certain times – ‘windows of opportunity’ when 
aboriginal rights, statuses and entitlements have been vociferously debated 
throughout Australian society. This was the case in 1967 with a lull in the 
1970s and 1980s but a resurgence in the 1990s with the Mabo court case and 
the Bringing Them Home report. 
The federal government’s involvement in Aboriginal affairs began on 2 
November 1967 – as a result of the 1967 referendum. The referendum, about 
the right of Aborigines to the vote was the occasion for the first public debate 
about full citizenship for Aborigines in the land of their birth.  This sparked 
widespread activism of Aboriginals and led to the famous ‘Tent Embassy’ 
  
 
57 
(1972) in front of the parliament buildings in Canberra.  The discourse shifted 
amongst Aborigines to a demand for self-determination. The question of 
entitlement of Aborigines became the focus of debate. The lack of an original 
treaty and the loss of Native Title was at the heart of the issue.  Aborigines 
looked to the Federal Government to resolve matters. 
Empowered with responsibility for Aboriginal affairs, the national government 
in Canberra was now expected to force the repeal of the racist legislation of 
the individual states and address the conditions of general deprivation in 
Aboriginal community.  However, problems arose because the federal 
government did not immediately assume the necessary practical responsibility 
for Aboriginal health and welfare.  As the state governments began repealing 
their Aboriginal Protection Acts in 1968, a political vacuum was created that 
severely exacerbated the living conditions and social/health status of 
Aboriginals throughout the country.  This, in turn, led to political upheaval in 
indigenous communities, most significantly in the urban centres of southeast 
Australia (As depicted in Ningla-Ana, 90min. B&W, dir. A. Cavadini, 1973). 
The first year of the Whitlam Labour government (1972) was a time of 
dramatic change, with the cabinet making ‘well over a thousand decisions, at 
an average rate of twenty a week’. (Manne 1999: 188) In early 1973, the 
Whitlam government became the first federal government to assume formal 
responsibility for Aboriginal people.  This necessitated the formation of a new 
agency to administer the significant funds allocated to Aboriginal Affairs.   
Gough Whitlam, leader of the Federal Opposition at the time of the 1967 
referendum, had strongly canvassed in favour of constitutional change 
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reference.  Whitlam said that the passage of the referendum meant there was 
no longer an alibi for a failure to improve the conditions of the Aboriginals.  
Whitlam stated that the Commonwealth's inability to enact special legislation 
for Aboriginals because their interests were the jurisdiction of the individual 
states had inhibited progress.  In his view, the referendum would remove the 
appearance of discrimination and enable the federal government to improve 
the condition of Aboriginals in terms of health, housing, employment, and 
community facilities. 
The Australian religious establishment also strongly advocated constitutional 
change, with the heads of all of the major denominations publicly pledging 
their support.  The Anglican Primate viewed the proposed changes as a way 
of helping build self-confidence, self-reliance, and self-respect among 
Aborigines.  The Whitlam government seemed to be committed to the process 
but it was short-lived to be replaced in 1975 by a more conservative Liberal 
government led by Fraser. 
 
The liberal democratic course, promoted by internal opposition forces in South 
Africa, found expression in 1994 in a social democratic constitution.  The 
Constitution embodied both a human rights and a socio-economic rights 
framework in order to deal with the contradictory legacy of apartheid.  When 
the democratically elected government came to power in South Africa, it 
inherited both the most developed economy in Africa on the one hand and 
major socio-economic problems on the other.  The most serious of these were 
high rates of unemployment; abject poverty among a growing proportion of 
the population; sharp inequalities in the distribution of income, property and 
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opportunities; and high levels of crime and violence (Terreblanche 2002: 25).  
It also inherited the legacy of the systemic consequences of the deprivation of 
land and economic opportunities for the vast majority of people.  None of 
these socio-economic problems were incidental or temporary in nature.  All of 
them were closely interlinked, and deeply rooted in South Africa’s extended 
colonial history (Terreblanche 2002: 26).  However, the manner in which the 
TRC terms of reference were defined, in fact limited the extent to which it 
would be able to address these systemic questions.  Ironically a human rights 
approach, which addressed the abuses of the past, could not deal with the 
pressing issues of poverty that arose from apartheid.  Individualising the 
apartheid experience limited the way the state could respond to the apartheid 
past, in particular the land question. 
 
The democratic transition between 1992 and 1994 and the subsequent 
measures to deal with South Africa’s past were hailed worldwide as a political 
miracle.  From a political and human rights point of view, South Africa put in 
place constitutional measures to ensure the protection and promotion of 
democracy. It also attempted to deal with the abuses of the past in ways 
similar to many post-conflict societies, by setting up the TRC (Terreblanche 
2002: 27).  However the TRC would never be able to meet the needs and 
interests of black people because of the limiting factor related to its terms of 
reference. 
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Land and its Implications 
 
In the Australian struggle, the optimism of the 1970s, generated by federal 
intervention after the 1967 Referendum gave way to disillusionment for the 
Indigenous population.  In the 1980s, Aboriginal affairs were pushed off the 
national agenda by recession.  In 1983, Labour came back to power and held 
it until 1996.  However, its approach to Aboriginal affairs was characterised by 
‘pragmatic drift’.  The land issue had become a bipartisan Aboriginal policy 
issue once the 1976 Land Rights Act had been passed under a conservative 
Liberal government.  The Land Rights Act had attempted to recognise 
Aboriginal land claims, but had satisfied nobody.  Aboriginal people 
reappeared on the national agenda during the Bicentenary in 1988, 
challenging the idea of a unitary citizenship and Australian nationhood, by 
focusing on their exclusions and particularly their land claims. This led to 
renewed activism, which in 1992 found expression in the High Court of 
Australia.  For over a year the media vibrated to the word ‘Mabo’, a land 
claims case that would change the moral stance of the nation.  The Mabo 
case would also change the interpretation of the land rights of Aboriginal 
people. This would not be uncontested by subsequent governments, but was 
hailed as a victory for Aboriginal land claims. The Keating Labour government 
(1991-1996) with renewed vision shaped the High Court’s decision into law. 
The judgement also produced the greatest newspaper controversy and the 
longest Senate debate in the history of Australia as Australians came to terms 
with the fiction of ‘terra nullius’ and the fact of native title (Broome 2001: 6, 7). 
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There were a number of landmark developments in the area of indigenous 
affairs during this period.  In 1992, the High Court’s decision in the Mabo case 
focused on the land rights issue rejected the assertion that Australia was terra 
nullius (land belonging to no-one), and found that Australian common law 
recognised the land rights of indigenous people stemming from their 
continued occupation and usage (Social Justice Report 2000).  The High 
Court noted that British sovereignty over the country had not extinguished the 
beneficial title to the land of the indigenous inhabitants, which they held under 
their own laws and customs.  The passage of Racial Discrimination Act in 
October 1975 was pivotal in protecting the native title rights established in the 
Mabo case.  Reynolds (1992) notes that the High Court’s decisive rejection of 
the concept of terra nullius consequently ruled it an inappropriate foundation 
for the Australian legal system.  Justice Brennan stated that the ‘fiction by 
which the rights and interests of the indigenous people in the land were 
treated as non existent’ was justified by a policy that ‘has no place in the 
contemporary law of this country’ (Reynolds 1992).  Moreover:  
 
A common law doctrine founded on unjust discrimination in the enjoyment 
of civil and political rights demands reconsideration.  It is contrary both to 
international standards and to the fundamental values of our common law 
to entrench a discriminatory rule which, because of the supposed position 
on the scale of social organisation of the indigenous inhabitants of a settled 
colony, denies them a right to occupy their traditional lands (Reynolds 
1992). 
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Justice Brennan contended that the acceptance of terra nullius in Australia 
resulted from the confusion of sovereignty and property, and claimed that 
‘only the fallacy of equating sovereignty and beneficial ownership of land that 
gives rise to the notion that native title is extinguished by the acquisition of 
sovereignty’ (Reynolds 1992). 
 
Reynolds (1992) suggests that for many Australians, both black and white, the 
Mabo decision represented an opportunity to achieve greater national 
resolution of the troubling question of Aboriginal land rights.  It also heralded 
an opportunity to improve relations between the two communities on such a 
divisive issue, while still ensuring indigenous people could genuinely 
repossess their inheritance. 
 
Noel Pearson (sited in Cowlishaw and Morris 1997), an Aboriginal activist 
lawyer, and former Executive Director of the Cape York Land Council, coined 
the concept of the ‘politics of victims in 1997 and asserted that unless the 
dominating state accepts the victims on their own terms, any complicity or 
interaction constitutes an unacceptable relinquishment of the victims’ power:  
  
For a long time, the only political currency which Aboriginal people could 
use was their refusal to be involved.  Now that the non-Aboriginal legal 
system has offered something in the way of rights, however narrow, to 
refuse to engage in the game and to fail to appreciate the rules and its 
limitations – even if our purpose be to disrupt the game – no longer seems 
smart.  The challenge is to negotiate the expansion of those rights without 
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losing ground and without surrendering the chance of future progress in a 
struggle which has seen incremental advances but whose resolution is still 
long in arriving (Cowlishaw, Morris 1997).  
The year following Mabo saw the next important native title case to be heard 
before the High Court: The Wik Peoples v The State of Queensland & Ors; 
The Thayorre People v The State of Queensland & Ors.  The Wik people of 
north Queensland commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia 
in June 1993 against the State of Queensland, the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Comalco Aluminium Limited, and Aluminium Pechiney Holdings Pty 
Ltd, claiming native title and other possessory rights over an area of land and 
sea.  The Thayorre peoples later joined in the suit as they made their own 
claim to part of the land claimed by the Wik peoples.  Justice Drummond 
found that pastoral leases over the land granted exclusive possession to the 
lessees and therefore extinguished native title.  The Wik and Thayorre 
peoples appealed to the Full Federal Court, and the suit was subsequently 
moved to the Australian High Court.  The substance of the appeal was based 
on whether the grant of a pastoral lease necessarily extinguished native title 
rights; the answer was based on the question of whether the pastoral leases 
granted exclusive possession of the land to the pastoralists (Bourke et al 2002: 
70). 
As the pastoral leases were created by statutes, Bourke et al (2002) suggest 
that the interpretation of the relevant legislation was pivotal in determining the 
nature of the rights and obligations flowing from the grant of each lease.  It 
was also necessary to identify native title rights in the case through reference 
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to indigenous traditions, customs, and practices.  Where there was any 
inconsistency, the rights of the pastoralists prevailed over native title rights.  
The effect of inconsistency - whether the native title rights were extinguished 
or suppressed - was not determined by the Court.  The decision was delivered 
on 23 December 1996  (Bourke et al 2002: 70). 
Indigenous people and their supporters held numerous land rights marches in 
the 1970s and 1980s, with many positive results.  Noel Pearson (sited in 
Cowlishaw, Morris 1997) suggests that increased political agitation by 
indigenous people in 1970s, combined with negative findings in land rights 
cases, gave rise to a political imperative to address the issue of native title.  If 
Aboriginals possessed no inherent right to land by law, then a moral onus was 
on parliament to create such rights.  Pearson notes that the Woodward 
Commission, established by the Whitlam Labour government (1972-1975), 
eventually led to the enactment of the Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) Act of 1976.  
The initiative had been taken by South Australia, and eventually similar, 
although increasingly inadequate, legislative land title measures were 
introduced in New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland (Cowlishaw, Morris 
1997). 
 
Conclusions 
The histories of South Africa and Australia, although very different, had 
established secondary citizen status on all non-white people.  Both South 
Africa and Australia had deprived indigenous people of their land, had 
redefined their role as wage labourers tied to migrancy.  Aboriginal activism in 
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Australia had in fact altered the formal status of Aboriginal people through the 
provision of the vote.  However, the structural deprivation associated with land 
alienation remained a critical factor in the claims made by Aboriginal people.  
The Federal State, although compelled by the Mabo and Wik court cases to 
address these, continually prevaricated and failed to institute land reform.  In 
the South African case, the Land Act of 1913 had essentially deprived African 
people from acquiring land outside reserves.  The democratic state after 1994 
also excluded the land issue from being the subject of the TRC.  Human rights 
abuse was defined in individual terms and thus excluded addressing 
substantive structural issues such as the land.   
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CHAPTER 4: THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION AND THE COUNCIL FOR ABORIGINAL 
RECONCILIATION 
 
‘Not everything that is faced can be changed, but nothing can be changed 
until it is faced’ – James Baldwin (2001) 
 
In the previous two chapters, a foundation was formed on which to base the 
discussion and examination of the South African and Australian reconciliation 
processes. It was important to first define the concepts of truth commissions 
and reconciliation, as well as to explore elements of the colonial past which 
created the oppressive environments in these two countries.  Only once the 
above issues have been incorporated in the study, can one move forward to 
explore the processes chosen to address the past. The following section 
critically examines and compares the establishment and conduct of the 
processes in Australia and South Africa.  An examination of the strengths and 
limitations of these processes allows us to determine the contributions they 
made towards truth and reconciliation in both countries. 
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Establishment, Construction and Aims 
 
The democratic transition in South Africa between 1992 and 1994 established 
constitutional measures to ensure the protection and promotion of democracy, 
and created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  The full remit of 
the TRC was finalised by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act, Number 34 of 1995 (also referred to as the TRC Act). The TRC began 
operating in December 1995 with the broad aim of ‘promoting national unity 
and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding that would transcend the 
conflicts and divisions of the past’ (TRC Report 1998: 55).  The TRC was 
given four major tasks: analysing and describing the causes, nature and 
extent of gross violations of human rights that occurred between 1 March 
1960 and 10 May 1994; making recommendations on measures to prevent 
future violations of human rights; restoring human and civil dignity of victims 
through testimony and recommendations concerning reparations for victims; 
and granting amnesty to persons who made full disclosure of relevant facts 
relating to acts associated with a political objective (TRC Report 1998: 57). 
Direct social and economic change has been considered a component of 
reconciliation rather than a necessary product of it.  The TRC pursued socio-
economic transformation and reconstruction only indirectly (Hamber and 
Kibble 1999). 
In Australia, the report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody, provided a complex and devastating picture of the effects of 
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dispossession, colonisation, and institutional racism on the indigenous people 
of Australia.  The report condemned the paternalistic assimilationist policies of 
the past and suggested that it was necessary to give up the long-held, if well 
intentioned, assumption that others knew what was best for Aborigines.  The 
Royal Commission recommended that Aboriginals should instead be 
recognised for what they are: a people with their own culture, history, and 
values (Social Justice Report 2000). 
Considering the recommendations of the above mentioned report, the 
Australian government enacted the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 
1991, with the hope that the legislation would usher in a decade of reform and 
social justice.  A complementary goal described in the legislation’s preamble 
was that Australia should seek a national commitment to progressively 
address Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander issues and aspirations in the 
decade leading to the centenary of Federation (1991–2001).  This 
commitment related to addressing land, housing, law and justice, cultural 
heritage, education, employment, health, infrastructure, and economic 
development matters (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 2000).  The 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR) was established in June 1991 with 
bipartisan support and with the stated objective of ‘the transformation of 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relations in Australia’ (Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation 2000).  While its formation was acknowledged as a necessary 
first step, it was recognised at the time that reconciliation would likely take 
longer than the mandated life of the Council (which would end on 1 January 
2001) (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 2000).   
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Boraine (2000), a former opposition member of Parliament and opponent of 
apartheid and Deputy Chairperson of the TRC, suggests that central to the 
TRC process was bringing into balance the political realities of the transition 
to democracy and the African philosophy of unity and reconciliation, rather 
than revenge and punishment.  The negotiated settlement in South Africa 
meant that some form of amnesty would be inevitable.  Simply put, there were 
limited options available to the incoming government, and their choices were 
influenced by this political reality (Boraine 2000).  The African National 
Congress (ANC) also lacked sufficient power at the negotiating table to 
ensure that any perpetrators would be prosecuted, but had enough influence 
to demand truth in exchange for amnesty (Hamber and Kibble 1999). The 
TRC process was thus devised with two purposes in mind: to meet the 
political demands of the time and to introduce a process that made 
acknowledgement and accountability possible.  Thus the issue was not ‘a 
straight trade-off between amnesty and criminal or civil trials.  What was at 
stake, rather, was a choice between more or less full disclosure; the option of 
hearing as many cases as possible against the possibility of a small number 
of trials revealing, at best, information only directly relevant to specific 
charges’ (TRC Report 1998: 122).  In this respect, it focused attention on the 
victims and survivors rather than the perpetrators (Boraine 2000).  Thus, 
although the Commission did not offer retributive justice, placing the amnesty 
process within a broader framework was likely to contribute to formal justice in 
the long term.  Instead of trading justice for truth, amnesty might eventually 
prove a more profitable option than the stark choice between truth and trials.  
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At least for societies in transition, truth must be viewed as an important 
element in restoring the rule of the law. 
 
Posel and Simpson (2003) argue that the TRC ‘took shape within the politics 
of negotiated compromise between the outgoing exponents of white minority 
rule and the incoming champions of constitutional democracy’ (Posel and 
Simpson 2003: 2,3).  They suggest that the  
…official confrontation with the past was seen not only as a means of 
setting a distorted and contested historical record straight, but also to 
foster individual and national reconciliation, through the catharsis of 
confession and forgiveness undergone by the perpetrators of human 
rights abuses and their victims, and an ensuing national consensus 
about the need to preserve a culture of human rights in the future.  The 
production of a shared national history and of public memories in 
respect of landmark historical events and struggles was understood to 
be an integral part of the new nation-building project.  Going further still, 
unveiling the truth was envisaged as a constitutionally defensible 
alternative to criminal prosecution, by enabling the granting of amnesty 
to perpetrators who made full disclosure (Posel and Simpson 2003: 
2,3). 
 
Posel and Simpson (2003) turn to Archbishop Tutu’s Foreword to the report, 
to underscore the vastness of this undertaking. It is ‘a road map to those who 
wish to travel into our past. It is not and cannot be the whole story; but it 
provides a perspective on the truth about a past that is more extensive and 
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more complex than any one commission could, in two and a half years, have 
hope to capture’ (Posel and Simpson 2003: 147,148). 
The South African TRC was intended inter alia to restore the humanity and 
dignity of the victim, but in a way that neither excluded nor replaced justice.  In 
this respect, the TRC advocated restorative justice to greater extent at a 
national level than at an individual level (Hamber and Kibble 1999).  The 
TRC’s objectives of centralisation, state building, and reducing legal pluralism 
were only partially fulfilled (James and Van De Vijver 2000; Wilson 2001). 
Posel and Simpson (2003) explain that:  
the pursuit of relevant “facts” was intended to be rigorous and 
substantial, drawing on appropriate expertise and experience, in the 
interests of “scientifically” objective and robust findings.  The 
Commission’s Research Department was given powers of search, 
seizure and subpoena, and was significantly larger and better 
resourced than most other truth commissions.  In prospect was a 
serious engagement with South Africa’s recent past, in which an 
analysis of the “antecedents and causes” of violence, “motives” of 
perpetrators, and chains of command and responsibility could become 
the object of systematic research (Posel and Simpson 2003: 4,5). 
The TRC had three committees to deal with the separate areas of human 
rights violations, amnesty, and reparations and rehabilitation.  According to 
section 14 of the Act, the Human Rights Violations Committee ‘was mandated, 
amongst other things, to enquire into systematic patters of abuse, to attempt 
to identify motives and perspectives, to establish the identity of individual and 
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institutional perpetrators, to find whether violations were the result of 
deliberate planning on the part of the state or liberations movements and to 
designate accountability, political or otherwise, for gross human rights 
violations’ (TRC Report 1998: 276). ‘The primary function of the Amnesty 
Committee was to consider applications for amnesty that were made in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act’; and to grant amnesty only for 
offences 'associated with a political objective committed between 1 March 
1960 and 6 December 1993' (TRC Report 1998: 267).  The Reparations and 
Rehabilitations Committee was the only TRC committee not to hold public 
hearings.  According to the TRC Act, it was tasked with considering  
matters referred to it by the Commission; gathering evidence relating to 
the identity, fate and whereabouts of victims and the nature and extent 
of the harm suffered by them; putting forward recommendations ‘on 
appropriate measures for reparation and rehabilitation and measures to 
be taken to restore dignity of victims; to make recommendations on 
urgent interim measures on reparations; and finally, to make 
recommendations on the creation of institutions conducive to a stable 
and fair society, and on the measures to be taken in order to prevent 
the commission of human rights violations (TRC Report 1998: 285).   
The TRC Report (1998) suggested that disclosures made during the amnesty 
process, together with information that emerged at the hearings of the Human 
Rights Violation Committee, in victim statements, and during investigations, 
would contribute significantly to the Commission’s understanding of the broad 
pattern of events during the thirty-four-year mandate period.  They would also 
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assisted the Commission in its analysis of key perpetrator groupings and 
institutional responsibility, and in making findings on the root causes of gross 
violations of human rights committed in the past.  These insights would 
provide the foundation for making recommendations aimed at both helping 
prevent future human rights violations and complementing the necessarily 
narrower focus of formal trials.  A functioning and effective justice system was, 
of course, crucially important in this regard in terms of reinforcing the rule of 
law and vindicating victims.  However, even a justice system functioning at its 
optimum level could not provide all the answers required (TRC Report 1998). 
The TRC was the first body to deal with conditional amnesty as a practical 
compromise between blanket amnesty and judicial prosecution and tried to 
incorporate lessons from past truth commissions (Hamber and Kibble 1999).  
Hamber (1995) argues that in South Africa there was an attempt to ensure 
that perpetrators gave something in exchange for amnesty: amnesty was 
conditional - it had to be applied for - and it was not granted unquestioningly 
(Hamber 1995). 
In the South African reconciliation process, an exclusive focus on punishment 
was rejected in favour of restorative justice.  The Commission sought to 
restore not only victims, but also perpetrators and the community at large.  
They sought to stress the context in which offences took place, and pointed to 
the need for the beneficiaries of the apartheid system to acknowledge their 
responsibility and accept their complicity.  The TRC focussed on reconciliation 
for the whole community, encompassing structures and institutions as well as 
individuals (Boraine 2000). On an individual level, the TRC made it possible to 
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reintegrate the perpetrators into their communities at the behest of the 
survivors, providing the latter felt the perpetrator had taken responsibility for 
their actions and made some form of restitution (Hamber and Kibble 1999). 
Boraine (2000) believed that unless economic justice was the first item on the 
agenda - i.e., unless health, homes, water, electricity and, most importantly, 
jobs became part of the quest for reconciliation - South Africa would remain a 
deeply divided society. 
During the CAR’s term, attention focused on the potential creation of a 
reconciliation ‘document or documents’, as well as on the future of the 
reconciliation process after the Council ceased to exist.  At the time, it was 
generally acknowledged that reconciliation would not be achieved by the fixed 
end date (Nettheim et al 2002).  The CAR held its second national convention, 
Corroboree 2000, in Sydney on 27 May 2000.  The centrepiece was the hand 
over to the federal and state governments of two documents prepared by the 
Council after wide-ranging consultations: the Australian Declaration Towards 
Reconciliation and the Roadmap for Reconciliation (Nettheim et al 2002).  On 
May 28th, an enormous march (known as the Bridge walk) in support of 
reconciliation occurred across the Sydney Harbour Bridge, as well as in other 
Australian towns and cities.  According to Nettheim et al (2002), these public 
demonstrations served as notice that ‘the people’s movement’ in support of 
reconciliation was a force to be reckoned with (Nettheim et al 2002). 
 
The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation devoted the last months of its term 
to preparing its final report, Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge, which was 
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presented in Parliament on 7 December 2000.  The report provided an 
overview of historical necessity of reconciliation and summarised the progress 
of the reconciliation process over the previous decade.  Finally, six 
recommendations outlined a feasible and accountable reconciliation process, 
which included the establishment of national committees and monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms and requesting assurances that the process would 
involve negotiation with indigenous people.  Having thus fulfilled its mandate, 
the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation ceased to exist on 31 December 
2000, ending the first ten-year phase of the reconciliation process. 
 
Grattan (2000) refers to Senator Aden Ridgeway, the Australian Democrats 
spokesperson on indigenous affairs and a former member of the CAR, who 
argued that Australians needed to go beyond a superficial social analysis of 
their history.  It became clear that national identity was often shaped by the 
traumatic forces of violence and conflict (Grattan 2000).  Unlike South Africa, 
official Australian historiography does not acknowledge the existence of 
widespread conflict and violence in the last century.  Instead, utilising an 
‘ideology of insulation’ it is argued that Australia developed differently from the 
rest of the world, secure in its isolation from global trends and disturbance.  
According to Ridgeway, this has enabled official Australian historical accounts 
to avoid investigating the true nature of the relationship between the 
European settlers and Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders.  In contrast, the 
indigenous perspective characterises the settler era as a most ‘bloody and 
violent period’ marked by war, slavery, conflict, and civil unrest.  The 
existence of a commonality among people who were denied recognition, 
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disempowered, and prevented from practising and maintaining a distinct 
cultural personality is understandable (Grattan 2000). 
 
Behrendt (2003) argues that redefining the relationship between indigenous 
and non-indigenous Australians requires an assessment of the impact of 
historical injustice:   
 
It is only when we understand how the ideologies of colonialism have 
permeated today’s institutions that we can begin to break the grip of the 
historical legacy.  Once that grip is broken, Australians will be free to 
explore alternatives to colonisation and assimilation (Behrendt 2003).   
 
While the recognition of past injustices would provide symbolic atonement for 
the misdeeds of colonisation, Behrendt (2003) concludes that there must also 
be a concerted campaign to transform Australian institutions that entrench 
negative ideologies and exclude indigenous people.  Moreover, opportunities 
and policies must be created that empower indigenous people and allow them 
to transcend the socio-economic circumstances in which they were born 
(Behrendt 2003). 
 
According to the Social Justice Report 2000, the perspective of the Australian 
government’s debate contended that it would be neither relevant nor fair to 
link events of the past to disadvantage and discrimination in the present.  
These refusals to accept the long-term impact of past practices on the current 
status of indigenous people, in turn, supported the argument that present day 
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Australians should not be held responsible or accept blame for historical 
events or acts.  It was also used as support for the notion that indigenous 
people use history to avoid accepting personal responsibility for their status or 
taking control of their own lives.  The Social Justice Report 2000 noted that 
this perspective failed to recognise the broader systemic nature of indigenous 
disadvantage and, instead, seeks to absolve the Australian government from 
responsibility (Social Justice Report 2000). 
 
Prime Minister Howard’s (1996-2007) claim that the wrongs committed 
against indigenous people were historic and therefore not the responsibility of 
present day Australians compounds the continual failure of Australian legal 
and political institutions to recognise native title as a legitimate property right 
(Behrendt 2003).  Behrendt (2003) argues that the rhetoric used to generate 
antagonism towards native title interests after the Wik case is also a factor in 
understanding the response to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission’s (HREOC) report, Bringing Them Home (1997), which describes 
the activities and legacy of the Aborigines Protection Board.  The report 
contains a detailed investigation of the experiences of people removed from 
their families by the Aboriginal welfare regimes in each state and territory.  
The report highlights a connection between the removal of indigenous 
children from their parents – the so-called ‘Stolen Generation’ - to ensuing 
problems of suicide, mental illness, substance abuse, family breakdown, and 
the cyclical poverty of indigenous communities (Behrendt 2003).  Howard 
asserted that Australians should feel neither guilt nor responsibility for past 
actions and policies.  The government stated: first, ‘there was never a 
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“generation” of stolen children’; and second, ‘emotional reaction to heart-
wrenching stories is understandable, but it is important to evaluate by 
contemporary standards decisions that were taken in the past’ (Behrendt 
2003). 
 
Nettheim (2003) noted that the CAR helped found local reconciliation groups 
around Australia, and assisted in the establishment of state and territory 
reconciliation committees.  Professor Nettheim, an Indigenous Law and 
Human Rights expert, argued that the zenith of the process was the 
Australian Reconciliation Convention held in Melbourne in 1997, which 
brought together people actively engaged in the reconciliation movement 
around the country (Interview: Nettheim 2003).   
 
Neill (2002) suggested that despite the formal adoption of self-determination 
three decades ago, attempts to significantly improve the living standards of 
indigenous people have largely failed.  Neill (2002) points out that public 
debate has so far refused to acknowledge the causes of this failure: observing 
taboos has become more important than exposing multi-faceted or 
unpalatable realities (Neill 2002). 
 
Strengths and Limitations of the Processes 
Considering its positive effects, Hamber and Kibble (1999) believe that the 
TRC fostered the restorative processes, allowing victims to meet and confront 
perpetrators.  In a few instances, perpetrators actually attempted to make 
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direct amends to the victims or survivors.  In this respect, reconciliation 
sometimes occurred spontaneously as the truth unfolded.  Survivors seized 
opportunities presented by the TRC, using it as part of their personal healing 
process and to seek answers to their questions from the perpetrators.  In 
addition, the TRC helped establish and support a range of local initiatives that 
ensured greater participation of the survivors in the Commission's process by 
taking into account their concerns (Hamber and Kibble 1999). Hamber (1995) 
notes that South Africa was the only country to allow some public and civil 
society debate over the terms and scope of the truth commission.  This 
debate led to its proceedings being held in public rather than in camera, as 
was first proposed by the parties in the negotiations process and initially by 
the new government.  However, while the South African TRC emphasised a 
public process, it also had powers to hold hearings in camera and to provide 
formal protection to witnesses (Hamber 1995). 
Boraine (2000) and Lötter (1997) argue that the TRC successfully employed a 
limited form of amnesty - defined by clear criteria and an acknowledgement 
that amnesty was not guaranteed - an emphasis on truth-telling by victims, 
and a reparations policy in an attempt to reach a consensus on what really 
happened during the apartheid period.  The South African model not only 
included specific reference to and concern for victims, but it also upheld the 
notion of truth telling by the perpetrators and the victims in a common 
commitment to restorative justice.  Publicly acknowledging the suffering of 
victims of past abuse reverses the inhuman treatment of people through 
political violence.  Ideally, the state’s public acknowledgement of their 
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participation in human rights violations bestows equal dignity and worth 
(Boraine 2000; Lötter 1997). 
 
Posel and Simpson (2003) assert that, in several respects, the TRC remains a 
remarkable achievement.   
One of its important successes has been in closing many individual 
“dossiers” on the past, revealing what happened to sons, fathers, 
brothers, sisters, mothers and daughters who had “disappeared”, 
tracing their killers, identifying the circumstances that led up to these 
ghastly deeds; also, vindicating individual allegations about torture 
perpetrated in the liberation movements and previously denied.  And, in 
many instances, these disclosures have been accompanied by the sort 
of catharsis and individual or interpersonal reconciliation that the TRC 
strove to achieve.  There were others for whom this process was less 
rewarding, people whose stories have not been fully heard, who feel 
frustrated by the haste which accompanied the TRC’s hearings and the 
inattention to the complexity of local histories of political conflict and 
violence.  Clearly, the task of unravelling these individual and local 
truths remains unfinished.  But if one effect of the TRC has been to 
animate popular interest in understanding the past, this must count as 
a success, despite the limits of its own rendition (Posel and Simpson 
2003: 166). 
Despite its problems, the TRC did have certain strengths:  first, it had more 
financial and personal resources than any truth commission to date; second, 
the TRC held the power to grant amnesty and reject blanket impunity; third, it 
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had the scope to interpret its own rules within the given mandate; and finally, 
the TRC permitted survivors and the general public to influence its work and 
methods of operation (Hamber and Kibble 1999). 
Although the TRC proclaimed a restorative approach at the national level, its 
operation at the individual level was less clearly defined.  Survivors did not 
necessarily have more say in the process or what happened to perpetrators 
than they would have had through the judicial process.  In fact, it could be 
argued that they actually had less input since the granting of amnesty meant 
that perpetrators were not sentenced.  Furthermore, restorative justice implied 
direct restitution from the perpetrator to the community or individual; without 
such restitution, amnesty broke the link between violation and obligation.  The 
TRC process placed most of the onus for reparation on the state; the 
survivors played no part in determining the perpetrators' contributions and the 
perpetrators were not obliged to make direct restitution (Hamber and Kibble 
1999).  This highlights one of the central tensions in the TRC project: the 
tension that exists between the individual and the collective.  Hamber and 
Kibble (1999) note that reconciliation was both an individual relationship and a 
part of a nation-building project.  Transformation, however, required real 
socio-economic change and institutional reform.  Not only did the survivors of 
apartheid see little change in their material circumstances, but they also saw 
their torturers still in office, their jobs preserved by so-called 'sunset clauses' 
and amnesty clauses agreed to during the negotiations.  Therein lay the 
contradictions between reconciliation and justice (Hamber and Kibble 1999).  
Hamber and Kibble (1999) also question the capacity of the TRC to promote 
reconciliation at all levels: at the individual level and for the collective, and 
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among different races/population groups, elites, and the military (Hamber and 
Kibble 1999). 
Posel and Simpson (2003) believe that ‘the promise was richer than the 
practice.  The TRC’s capacity to verify the evidence and information placed 
before it was severely impaired.  This significantly compromised the quality of 
the empirical data necessary to sustain the sorts of positivist outcomes 
anticipated in the TRC’s legislative and political mandate’ (Posel and Simpson 
2003: 5).  
Mahmood Mamdani, at the time based at the Centre for African Studies at the 
University of Cape Town, criticised the TRC for defining victims too narrowly.  
In his opinion, South Africa's reliance on Latin America’s experience with 
dealing with reconciliation led to an over emphasis on the notion of 
perpetrators and victims, thereby ignoring the unique structural issues related 
to victimisation in South Africa. According to Mamdani, the result was an 
insufficient focus on those who benefited from apartheid, but may not have 
been direct perpetrators of human rights violations; this included the majority 
of the white population, who benefited materially from apartheid and was 
complicit in the abuses by its silence.  This made the TRC a-contextual in its 
approach, even if its origin was particularly contextual (Hamber and Kibble 
1999). 
Justice Langa of the Constitutional Court of South Africa argued that at the 
collective or social level, reconciliation in South Africa did not mean 
forgetfulness.  Moreover, on an individual level, there could be no 
reconciliation if the torturer took forgiveness for granted.  He added that 
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reconciliation was a long-term process rather than a ‘one-off’ event (Hamber 
and Kibble 1999).   
Hamber and Kibble (1999) argue that truth is integral to reconciliation at the 
collective and individual level.  Thus, in order for reconciliation to take place, a 
clear record was required so individuals and the country could deal openly 
with the past.  In this respect, if it was understood how violations occurred, 
mechanisms could be established to prevent them from recurring.  However, 
truth was too often equated with reconciliation.  Nevertheless, truth was 
necessary for laying the foundations of the reconciliation process, a process 
that appeared to work best at the individual level when spearheaded by civil 
society (Hamber and Kibble 1999). 
While the TRC seemed to be passing judgment on the practices of the 
apartheid regime, it was actually incapable of that type of judgment; the 
Commission could not come to terms with the underlying structures and 
processes of apartheid because they were outside its terms of reference.  
According to Wilson (2001), the TRC was not particularly effective at creating 
a new culture of human rights or greater respect for the rule of law.  As long 
as human rights institutions function as a substitute for criminal prosecutions, 
they will be resisted by some victims and denounced as a ‘sell-out’ by informal 
justice institutions (Wilson 2001). 
 
Legal scholars and TRC researchers suggest that most of the legal and 
jurisprudence dilemmas presented by the TRC process were rooted in its ‘bi-
polar roles’ as a ‘fact-finding’ and a quasi-judicial enterprise on the one hand  
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and as a psychologically sensitive mechanism for story telling and healing on 
the other.  The legislation that defined the operational terms of the TRC was 
not an ideal document, leaving many issues poorly defined or excluded 
altogether (James and Van De Vijver 2000; Simpson 1998; Wilson 2001; 
Meiring 1999). 
Hamber and Kibble (1999) argue that prosecutions should have been an 
integral final step in the overall TRC process, and that those alleged 
perpetrators who did not apply for amnesty should have been prosecuted. 
The failure to secure a conviction for Magnus Malan may have made some 
dismiss the legal route to truth; however, some convictions, such as that of 
Ferdi Barnard for the murder of anti-apartheid activist David Webster, 
demonstrate that the formal justice system could produce results (Hamber 
and Kibble 1999).  Hamber and Kibble (1999) argue that it was vital for trials 
to be initiated against those who failed to apply for amnesty.  This would have 
sent a clear message that the TRC was both a restorative and rigorous formal 
justice process aimed at re-establishing the rule of law.  It could have also 
revealed new truths that were not forthcoming during the actual TRC process 
(Hamber and Kibble 1999).   
One of the most serious criticisms of the TRC is over the apparent gap 
between the reparations and amnesty processes.  However, such measures 
are necessary to overcome the perception of many victims that the 
perpetrators gained more than survivors from the process.  Thus, lobbying for 
the speedy processing of reparations was critical (Hamber and Kibble 1999). 
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The Commission acknowledged some of its failings and operational 
constraints in its 1998 report.  These included: failing to identify early enough 
a number of areas to which it should have devoted more time and energy; 
failing to call certain key actors before it; failing to provide an in-depth 
examination of civil society’s complicity in the crimes and misdeeds of the 
past; failing to deal with specific geopolitical areas and the violations that 
occurred in those areas in sufficient detail; and failing to contest the 
constraints imposed on its investigative capacity (TRC Report 1998). 
 
In Posel and Simpson (2003) argued that:  
The tasks set for the TRC were well beyond its capacities to carry out.  
The multiple mandates with which it was charged and the limited 
resources it had at its disposal forced it to rand in order of priority the 
different types of investigation it could undertake.  The political 
imperatives of the time impelled it to place the pursuit of forensic truth 
and restorative truth at the top of its list.  This left little time and 
capacity to probe the larger issues of context and motivation.  However, 
the constraints and pressures that shaped the Commission’s agenda 
were only partly responsible for the report’s explanatory vacuity.  The 
Commissioners and research teams must also bear some of the 
responsibility for its failure to uncover social truth.  Such an exercise 
would have required much more finely grained local studies, drawing 
on larger slices of life history, than the snapshot victim statements that 
furnished much of the raw material of the report (Posel and Simpson 
2003: 198). 
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For Posel and Simpson (2003), in the final analysis, on the evidence of its 
own discourse and mandate, 
The TRC could only render up a range of fractured, incomplete and 
selective truths.  In its quest for forensic truth, the TRC set up a 
standard that is not even sustained within the criminal justice system, 
which seeks proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Indeed, in yielding to 
the propensity for criminal law to define a narrow universe of facts 
designed only to reach conclusions about individual liability, it 
cultivated a standard of proof that simply could not creatively engage 
the contradictions that complicate sociological or historical truth at the 
structural level.  Yet, at the same time, the TRC sought to span these 
levels of individual, local and national truth recovery. The 
commissioning of the “truth” under the auspices of the TRC was 
framed by a mandate that was essentially impossible to fulfil.  The 
process produced no integrated, comprehensive or internally 
consistent body of “truth”.  To some extent, the obstacles to such a 
goal could have been overcome with fuller planning and foresight, 
more effective research in certain, areas, closer organisational 
synchrony between the different institutions and functions of the 
Commission, more time and greater political will. Yet the tensions 
among different genres of evidence, argument and “truth” also inherent 
in the process and contributed to – rather than wholly detracted from – 
the scope and impact of the Commission.  The idea of “truth” is 
variegated, and so it is appropriate to view the TRC as a set of 
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disparate processes with distinct accomplishments as well as 
limitations.  Ultimately, the politics of “truth” may render the 
unevenness and incompleteness of the TRC’s “truth-finding” as a 
strength rather than a weakness. If “the past is an argument”, then we 
should welcome the fact that the TRC did not settle the matter, close 
the debate, and put paid to lingering questions and controversies about 
South Africa’s troubled history (Posel and Simpson 2003: 11,12,13). 
The TRC did not manage to develop a definitive chronicle of the apartheid era.  
In addition, the TRC admitted that it was unable to adequately explore and 
investigate the violence that occurred from 1990 to 1994.  The Commission 
also acknowledged its serious error in not conducting a search and seizure 
operation of the defence archives (Hamber and Kibble 1999). 
There are counter-arguments to these criticisms of the TRC's mandate.  
Hamber and Kibble (1999) point out that focusing on the structural oppression 
of apartheid might have made the TRC's work unmanageable.  Alex Boraine, 
the Deputy Chairperson of the TRC, found that apartheid's beneficiaries hated 
the TRC, and that complaints and letters to the TRC did not support the 
contention that the beneficiaries were 'off the hook'.  He said that responses 
written by members of the public in the Reconciliation Register did not 
demonstrate an expectation of forgiveness, but instead asked: 'What can I do 
to atone?'  Alex Boraine's comments highlight the idea that the TRC process 
sensitised some 'beneficiaries' of apartheid (mostly white South Africans) to 
their complicity with the apartheid system.  In fact, some of the signatories 
donated money to the TRC for the benefit of the victims.  How representative 
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the Reconciliation Register was of general feeling in the white South African 
population is open to question (Hamber and Kibble 1999). 
For Posel and Simpson (2003), ‘the limits of the ‘history’ written by the TRC in 
turn inhibit its ‘cathartic’ and ‘healing’ qualities.  With its powers of explanation 
stunted, the TRC cannot produce a consensus about why the terrible deeds of 
the past were committed.  The increasingly familiar refrain among white South 
Africans that apartheid was merely a ‘mistake’ for which no one was 
responsible, that somehow the system propelled itself impersonally, may be 
one of the more ironic, unintended consequences of the TRC’s rendition of 
the past’ (Posel and Simpson 2003: 168).  They argue that to the extent that 
the report does venture into historical explanation, its consequences may 
once again be deeply ironic.  The report’s only answer to the question of why 
the country was subjected to such a violent and abusive past is itself in need 
of explanation – the prevalence and intensity of racism.  But in the absence of 
an explanation for racism itself, the report fails to suggest any plausible 
grounds for transcending the racism of the past.  If racism was part of the 
warp and woof of South African society, how can it be undone? The fact that it 
is embedded in the social fabric is also a measure of its tenacity.  If we do not 
understand the conditions under which racism was produced, reproduced and 
intensified in South Africa, taking account of its interconnections with other 
modes of power and inequality such as gender and class, how can we 
transcend it? (Posel and Simpson 2003: 168).   
 
Whatever the limits of its report, the TRC has created significant 
opportunities for an engagement with the past, which have not yet 
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been realised fully.  Its large archive promises to be an important 
resource for academic and popular historians, provided it remains open 
and accessible.  It seems that the TRC has stimulated an interest in 
and enthusiasm for truth-telling, in communities intent on unravelling 
the complexities of their past.  And there is much more to be said about 
the mechanisms of leaders in the apartheid state and the homeland 
governments, and the liberation movements which opposed them. In 
the final analysis, it is a strength rather than a weakness of the TRC 
that it has initiated a process of truth-telling without seeing it through to 
completion (Posel and Simpson 2003: 168).  If “the past is an 
argument”, then it should not be limited to a single distillation under one 
official rubric.  The responsibility falls to a range of different research 
communities and intellections to diversify the terms of debate and 
prevent its premature conclusion (Posel and Simpson 2003: 168).  The 
stakes are high: As Ignatieff puts it, “national identity [should be] a site 
of conflict and argument, not a silent shrine for collective worship’’ 
(quoted in Posel and Simpson 2003: 168,169). 
 
For Van der Merwe, (quoted in Posel and Simpson (2003)) it was  
clear that the promotion of national reconciliation does not 
automatically produce reconciliation at other levels in the society.  
Despite political and international transformation at the national level, 
and the creation of peaceful relations between erstwhile political 
opponents at the community level, the truth (or lack of it) remains a 
volatile social issue in the local arena.  Reconciliation at community 
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level will require extensive further intervention, dealing directly with 
truth, as well as other concerns, through more open-ended and 
sustained dialogue, investigation and reflection (Posel and Simpson 
2003: 217). 
 
In relation to the Australian situation, the first decade of reconciliation during 
the CAR witnessed a major shift in public and political attitudes, with 
reconciliation moving from a little understood concept to a key item on the 
national agenda.  However, it noted that significantly divergent views existed 
on the meaning of reconciliation and how it could be achieved.  The CAR 
report argued that reconciliation should be flexible enough adapt to local 
needs and circumstances within a nationally recognised framework.  The 
Council firmly believed that its two reconciliation documents (the Declaration 
and the Roadmap) provided such a framework (Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation 2000). The Council also warned about the apparent 
persistence of ignorance, apathy, resistance, and opposition to reconciliation 
within some areas of the Australian community.  They cited one poll indicating 
that almost half of Australians believed that Aboriginals and Torres Strait 
Islanders were not ‘disadvantaged’, despite the existence of overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary.  According to the Council, continuing acute 
disadvantage, discrimination, and racism remained the single greatest 
challenge to achieving reconciliation (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 
2000).  In addition, the Council also found that not all Aboriginals and Torres 
Strait Islanders were convinced of the need for the reconciliation process.  
Research indicated that some indigenous people were unconvinced that 
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reconciliation could improve employment, education, and housing outcomes, 
or make any substantial difference to their daily life circumstances.  Thus, 
despite some important advances, public awareness and education on all 
sides remained a key task of the reconciliation process (Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation 2000).   
 
While the CAR report noted that the government’s bipartisan decision to 
launch the formal reconciliation process was correct – and that all Australians 
could take heart from the progress to date - it would take far longer than a 
decade to address the legacy of 200 years of history (Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation 2000). 
 
Conclusions 
Did the TRC reveal the truth? The individualist approach to human rights 
violations limited the extent that ‘the truth’ could be fully revealed. It limited the 
possibilities of seeing the individual acts in a broader framework of the 
apartheid system as a whole. Hamber and Kibble (1999) argue that 
determining the effectiveness of the TRC at revealing the ‘truth’ can be 
approached on two levels: first, at the level of individual case work and 
investigation; and, second, at the level of the apartheid system and 
responsibility for violations (Hamber and Kibble 1999). Hamber and Kibble 
(1999) contend that the TRC failed to uncover as much as was hoped, 
particularly regarding individual cases.  Granted, time and a shortage of 
resources operated against the TRC's Investigation Unit (IU) being able to 
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successfully investigate the thousands of cases put before it.  Moreover, a 
substantial volume of documents and records had been destroyed by the old 
security apparatus (Hamber and Kibble 1999). Thus, in terms of seeking to 
establish the truth in individual cases, the TRC was set an impossible task.  
Many victims expected full disclosure and a complete investigation of their 
case, which was unrealistic.  In this respect, the TRC may have failed to 
communicate its purpose effectively.  Moreover, the Commission did not 
report back to the majority of survivors on the status of their cases (Hamber 
and Kibble 1999).  Hamber and Kibble (1999) question whether truth really 
achieves reconciliation.  In addition, the difficulties inherent in uncovering the 
truth highlight the notion that reconciliation may not be possible if the whole 
truth is not known (Hamber and Kibble 1999).  
Did the TRC uncover a larger truth?  Was the report a comprehensive and fair 
representation of the history of South Africa during the apartheid era? Hamber 
and Kibble (1999) note that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's final 
report revealed a considerable amount of information about the workings of 
the apartheid state system.  The previous government was found responsible 
for most of the atrocities: In other words, the state fostered an environment 
that led to and sanctioned human rights violations.  However, the political 
parties, including the National Party, still have not taken full responsibility for 
these atrocities.  While they have offered apologies for specific acts, there has 
never been a full acknowledgment of their complicity in developing the 
apartheid system or the impact of that system on individuals (Hamber and 
Kibble 1999).  Alex Boraine, Former Vice-Chairperson of the TRC, notes that 
while ‘foot soldiers’ and even generals applied for amnesty for specific crimes, 
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thereby accepting blame for their actions, political leaders generally refused to 
take responsibility for systematic human rights violations (Hamber and Kibble 
1999). 
 
Boraine (2000) argues that the TRC not only broke the silence surrounding 
the apartheid era, but also initiated an on-going long-term reconciliation 
process.  The TRC frankly and frequently acknowledged that reconciliation 
could not be achieved by a single commission operating over a limited period 
and with limited resources (Boraine 2000).  Hamber and Kibble (1999) 
suggest that people are likely to feel that some collective form of justice had 
been achieved through the TRC because those responsible for past atrocities 
had to admit to and account for their actions.  They argue that the TRC was 
more successful at the level of collective repudiative, rehabilitative, and 
restorative justice than at the individual level (Hamber and Kibble 1999). 
Has the substitution of justice for truth succeeded in establishing collective 
and individual truth?  What are the long-term implications - for peace, 
reconciliation, and the rule of law in South Africa - of using this strategy?  
(Hamber and Kibble 1999) How far did the TRC influence the transformation 
in South Africa?  
Given that the Commission was born from compromise, negotiation, and the 
balance of forces at the time, Hamber and Kibble (1999) contend that it is 
unlikely the TRC could have driven transformation in the country, particularly 
in the economic and social spheres.  The TRC bore the weight of 
transformation only in legal and moral areas; unfortunately, so little 
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transformation occurred elsewhere that the foundation for reconciliation and 
openness were in danger of being undermined.  While defenders of the 
government could point to a number of land, housing, electricity, and 
infrastructural improvements, many believed that the government was 
focussed on pursing a neo-liberal program that had little chance of 
overcoming the inequalities and economic oppressions of the past or 
alleviating poverty (Hamber and Kibble 1999). 
The TRC acknowledged that a key element of the transition was establishing 
a common history for all South Africans.  Hamber and Kibble (1999)argue that 
the Commission ceased operation with much of its historical work incomplete, 
which had a definite impact on how it made recommendations and 
implemented reparations.  There were thousands of unsolved cases, with 
many survivors still waiting for responses, and many South Africans were 
angry over what they perceived as a lack of justice in the TRC process and 
continued socio-economic inequities.  Despite some valuable 
recommendations in the TRC's final report, a significant gap still existed in 
South Africa between policy and actual implementation, which could only add 
to general frustration with the transition (Hamber and Kibble 1999). 
Recognising the importance of consultation and good-faith negotiations 
between all parties, as well as the need for informed public debate about the 
issues of reconciliation, the CAR report recommended the introduction of 
legislation to deal with the unresolved issues of reconciliation.  The CAR 
reported contended that such legislation had the potential to facilitate much 
needed agreement and the settlement of outstanding matters between 
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Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders and other Australians (Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation 2000).  However, as the first decade of reconciliation 
ended, the stark reality was that indigenous people remained the most 
disadvantaged and discriminated against group in Australian society.  They 
experienced poorer health, shorter life expectancy, limited education and 
employment opportunities, and greater imprisonment compared to other 
Australians.  Moreover, economic disadvantage restricted their life choices 
and served as a major obstacle to self-determination.  The Council itself 
argued that many sharp divisions about the nature and purpose of 
reconciliation still had to be addressed (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 
2000).  
 
The CAR report suggested that Australia could never become a ‘reconciled’ 
nation while stark contrasts in social and economic outcomes existed between 
Aboriginals, Torres Strait Islanders, and other Australians.  The Council 
stressed the existence of an important connection between the resolution of 
outstanding rights issues and the practical economic aspects of reconciliation.  
They argued that the lasting effects of dispossession, marginalisation, and the 
assimilationist policies played a key role in defining the current status of 
indigenous people in Australia.  In this respect, the CAR report stated that the 
resolution of outstanding issues such as native title and the ‘Stolen 
Generations’ was a necessary pre-condition for Aboriginals and Torres Strait 
Islanders to achieve economic independence and overcome disadvantage 
(Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 2000). 
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The CAR report also argued that despite concerted opposition in some 
quarters, reconciliation would ultimately require a formal and final resolution of 
issues that had remained unaddressed from the period when Australia was 
settled without the consent of its indigenous inhabitants.  Simply put, 
legislation was considered necessary to establish a framework for negotiating 
the resolution of outstanding issues - perhaps through a treaty - and without 
such a measure true and lasting reconciliation was not a foregone conclusion 
(Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 2000). 
 
In Australia, the presentation of the final report of the Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation in 2000 marked the public emergence of a new group, 
Reconciliation Australia.  Although a non-governmental organisation, 
Reconciliation Australia was the inheritor and successor to the CAR.  In the 
ongoing reconciliation process, its stated role was ‘to report on progress to the 
Australian community, circulate information, encourage partnerships, and 
provide forums for discussions’ (Reconciliation Australia 2002: 3).  Moreover, 
CAR tasked it with maintaining a national focus for the reconciliation process, 
report on its progress to the Australian community, circulate information and 
educational material, encourage partnerships, and provide forums for 
discussion (Social Justice Report 2001).  Reconciliation Australia’s initial 
strategic plan targeted social and economic equity for indigenous people.  It 
also sought to strengthen the people’s movement for reconciliation and thus 
build a framework for a shared future.  Some of these action areas and 
commitments were shared with the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) (Social Justice Report 2001).  
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While Reconciliation Australia was generally considered as the successor to 
the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, there were significant differences 
between the organisations.  First, as a not-for-profit private company, 
Reconciliation Australia’s operation and objectives were not mandated or 
controlled by Parliament.  Accordingly, its relationship with the government 
was based on goodwill rather than any formally legislated requirements.  
Second, Reconciliation Australia might have appeared to be the national 
coordinator of reconciliation, but it lacked the necessary funding.  For example, 
the ‘seed’ funding provided by the government was only equivalent to six 
months of its operational costs, which had to be met through fundraising 
activities from the corporate sector and the community.  Monetary constraints 
prevented Reconciliation Australia from having the influence and reach of the 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation.  It simply could not pay for ongoing 
nationally significant public awareness activities and campaigns.  These 
funding shortfalls, in turn, limited its ability to adequately monitor and evaluate 
the government’s reconciliation efforts; lacking a government mandate and 
financial support, Reconciliation Australia could not hold the government 
accountable.  Indeed, the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation had never 
envisioned that Reconciliation Australia would have to operate as the principal 
monitoring body.  The CAR believed that a centralised, coordinated approach 
to reconciliation was required at the national level to ensure that reconciliation 
continued to grow, a role that Reconciliation Australia was obviously ill 
equipped to play (Social Justice Report 2001). 
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Posel and Simpson (2003) argue that, in this context,  
it is simplistic to describe South Africa as a “post-conflict” society in the 
wake of the TRC.  Instead, the real challenge lies in grappling with and 
monitoring continuity and change in the patterns of social conflict that 
continue to dominate the democratic South Africa, and the easy slide 
between political and criminal violence that has always complicated 
analysis of South African life, but which may have been shrouded 
rather than exposed by the TRC.  In seeking to meet this challenge, 
this paper point to some of the (perhaps inevitable) limitations of the 
TRC as a restorative justice mechanism in the true sense of the term, 
because of its historical imperative and its explicit mandate to deal with 
the issues of violence and reconciliation exclusively by reference to 
political responsibility, narrowly defined (Posel and Simpson 2003: 245). 
 
They furthermore suggest that  
proper evaluation of the efficacy of transitional justice mechanisms 
such as the TRC must therefore be situated within the specific context 
of transmuting patterns of violence.  This perspective demands a shift 
in the debates on transitional justice, from an exclusively retrospective 
scrutiny of past injustices, important as this is, to a strategic and 
proactive engagement with the challenges that face justice institutions 
in newly emerging democracies, where patterns of violence and social 
conflict change, rather than simply being brought to an end by political 
settlements, and where the lines of social cleavage at the heart of such 
historical violence are redefined rather than simply staying the same.  
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Such an approach demands an engagement both with the past and 
with the future, and insists not only on a scrutiny of justice in transition, 
but of violence in transition as well (Posel and Simpson 2003: 245,246). 
 
For Posel and Simpson (2003), this  
analysis has profound implications for how we understand the roles 
and challenges of transitional justice interventions, including the South 
African TRC.  In particular, it suggests the need for a less simplistic or 
theoretical understanding of the dangers of impunity in society, as 
opposed to one simply premised on the need for compliance with the 
principles of public international law (vital though this is).  In the final 
analysis, it remains difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions about the 
TRC, although evidently it has not made quite the contribution to 
reconciliation claimed by its most ardent supporters and assumed by 
international audiences from a distance.  Certainly, it would be a grave 
mistake to judge the whole TRC by the obvious shortcoming of its final 
report, which simply cannot hope (and does not pretend) to reflect the 
full complexity of thirty-five years of history.  The great value of the 
TRC lay in the process rather than the published end product (Posel 
and Simpson 2003: 246).   
 
They finally suggest that  
we should also guard against a “sanitised public transcript” which 
suggests that anger, vengeance, or violent conflict are absent from 
post-apartheid South Africa.  There is a grave risk that out of the 
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testimonies and confessions of a few, a truth will be constructed that 
disguises the way in which black South Africans, who were 
systematically oppressed and exploited under apartheid, continue to be 
excluded and marginalised in the present.  The sustained or growing 
levels of violent crime and antisocial violence, which appear to be new 
phenomena associated with the transition to democracy, are in fact 
rooted in the very same experiences of social marginalisation, political 
exclusion and economic exploitation that previously gave rise to the 
more “functional” violence of resistance politics.  The fundamentals of 
social and economic justice were untouched by the TRC (Posel and 
Simpson 2003: 246). 
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CHAPTER 5:  RECONCILIATION, RIGHTS AND RECOGNITION 
 
 ‘If the 1967 Referendum brought Aboriginal people into the census, the Mabo 
judgement brought them into the common law.  Reconciliation may yet bring 
them into the nation’ -Richard Broome (2001) 
 
In this chapter we alaborate on Chapter 4, by considering the obstacles faced 
by the two reconciliation processes. We also tie in the next two variables 
identified  which include the respective governments’ responses to 
reconciliation, as well as briefly focussing on the degree of pressure placed on 
these countries by the international community. 
 
Reconciliation: Obstacles to Overcome 
 
Can a nation be reconciled and healed after violence, conflict, and oppression?  
The secret for Lederach is that the parties be brought together to build a new 
kind of relationship – through the space created by the reconciliation process. 
So the point is to recognize past grievances, pain, suffering and loss and, 
says Lederach (1997), ‘explore future interdependence’ (Lederach 1997: 34). 
 
Grattan (2000) argues that a nation cannot be told how to reconcile; rather, it 
must flow from a natural acceptance of the need for truth and justice.  The 
ideal outcome of reconciliation is the creation of a new social compact that 
promotes and balances rights and responsibilities against the needs of the 
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wider community, economy, and state. Alex Boraine, the former Vice-
Chairperson of South Africa’s TRC, argues that reconciliation is an intensive 
and essentially endless pursuit of healing.  It must be nurtured and anchored 
at every level of society, whether political, social, or economic (Boraine 2000: 
429). 
 
According to the TRC Report, the vast majority of people involved in the 
South African process sincerely believed that reconciliation was possible.  
However, national reconciliation within the short lifespan and limited mandate 
and resources of the TRC was impossible to achieve.  What the TRC did 
accomplish was to restore human dignity to many victims and aid them in 
coming to terms with the past (TRC Report 1998: 17). 
 
Although the reconciliation process challenged entrenched attitudes in South 
Africa, Boraine (2000) concedes that South Africa remains trapped by racism, 
divisions, and stereotyping (Boraine 2000: 358).  Yet, he notes that 
reconciliation began even before the formal TRC process was implemented, 
and it will continue as long as all parties share a basic acceptance of its 
principles.  In contrast, Orr (2000), Hamber (1995), and Meredith (1999) argue 
that reconciliation was an unattainable goal from the outset, and that little had 
changed at the national level by end of the TRC mandate.  They contend that 
a single initiative like the TRC could never overcome the deep wounds 
created by apartheid, but only lay the foundation for future reconciliation.  The 
value of publicly revisiting apartheid era oppression was the creation of a new 
collective history for South Africa (Orr 2000, Hamber 1995, Meredith 1999). 
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Grattan (2000) argues that the reconciliation process in Australia provided the 
foundation for a new relationship based on understanding the value of 
different perspectives.  This requires the successful integration of formerly 
oppressed people into the nation, allowing them to become stakeholders in 
making the decisions that affect their lives.  This approach maintains that the 
delivery of justice requires a policy response from the government that is 
defined by positive engagement and the genuine desire to develop a process 
of constructive partnership that can improve the lives of indigenous people 
and alter negative attitudes (Grattan 2000).   
 
Nursey-Bray (2003) notes, that the Australian and South African experiences 
are similar in that neither country established a definitive or universally 
accepted meaning of reconciliation.  However, in Australia, differences in 
interpretation made it very difficult to move beyond the status quo: While 
neither side had a clear vision of what they wanted, both sides rejected the 
other’s perspective.  For Aboriginals, reconciliation meant recognition of their 
historic occupation and oppression in the country, but for many white 
Australians it represented an attempt to learn to live together (Interview: 
Nursey-Bray 2003). 
 
According to Hamber and Van der Merwe (1998), the TRC also failed to 
provide a clear definition of reconciliation for South Africans.  Indeed, the 
ultimate purpose and ideal form of reconciliation diverges greatly among 
different sectors of society.  A non-racial notion of reconciliation that focused 
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on a human rights approach was the most consistent vision presented by the 
TRC.  This approach emphasised the need for acknowledgement, repentance, 
and apology before the adoption of any legal or human rights strategy 
(Hamber and Van der Merwe 1998). 
 
Dick (2003) suggests that South Africa’s conception of reconciliation was 
more easily understood by the public than that in Australia.  Indeed, many of 
the non-indigenous members of the Australian population denied there was 
even a problem requiring reconciliation.  In turn, Aboriginals were suspicious 
of Australia’s promotion of multi-culturalism because it seemed to propose the 
future obliteration of their distinctive identity (Interview: Dick 2003).  
 
A general refusal to address the past characterises the dominant non-
indigenous national identity of both Australia and South Africa.  White 
Australians will not accept their historical role as colonial oppressors, while 
white South Africans struggle to confront their oppressive rule of the 
indigenous African population during apartheid.   
 
Nursey-Bray (2003) argues that one of the central obstacles to reconciliation 
in Australia is the Aboriginals’ persistent fear of assimilation, which is not 
surprising given their collective historical experiences.  They feel that 
integration into the Australian mainstream could spell the disappearance of 
their culture.  While Aboriginals seek full equality within the state, they also 
define themselves as a separate entity, which inherently raises questions 
about the legal jurisdiction of Australian institutions in their lives (Interview: 
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Nursey-Bray 2003).  Fear about maintaining a separate cultural identity for 
Aboriginals stems partly from their small population.  Nursey-Bray (2003) 
argues that because Africans are the majority in South Africa, there was never 
any question they were at risk of assimilation or losing their unique cultural 
identity (Interview: Nursey-Bray 2003).  
 
This context generates other questions that must be addressed: When does a 
settler become a native? According to Nursey-Bray (2003), the TRC tried to 
address this question: in other words, to use reconciliation to legitimise the 
status of whites within South Africa.  In this respect, land rights claims in 
Australia have a very specific purpose: to return part of the land that was 
taken under certain conditions.  The apparently willful incomprehension and 
failure to confront this issue lies at the heart of Australian reconciliation 
problems (Interview: Nursey-Bray 2003).     
 
Unlike in South Africa where a liberation ‘civil war’ was fought from 1961 
onwards with the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the 
ANC, violent pressure against the government for the recognition of Aboriginal 
rights in Australia was intermittent.  Why?  Was it a question of numbers, a 
lack of resources, or a lack of unity? In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
Aboriginal rights movement became increasingly vocal and confrontational, 
which forced the government to engage in some type of reconciliation process.  
Interestingly, it was the rising militancy, evidenced by the ‘Tent Embassy’, that 
partially explains the government’s willingness to address Aboriginal issues in 
  
 
106 
the late 1960s and 1970s.  This militancy then dissipated for a number of 
reasons, only to re-emerge in late 1980s and early 1990s.  
 
According to Dick (2003), South Africa had to confront its race problems 
because of the exclusionary, violent, and ultimately unsustainable nature of 
apartheid oppression.  Simply put, the civil war and international sanctions 
forced the apartheid regime to negotiate.  These extreme conditions simply 
did not exist in Australia.  Aboriginals did not possess the population numbers 
sufficient to pressure the Australian government into negotiation or action, and 
this meant they could be ignored or marginalised over extended periods with 
few measurable consequences (Interview: Dick 2003). 
 
The Howard years were characterised by a ‘leadership vacuum’ in Aboriginal 
policy and, as a result, white Australians are still very confused about the 
actual status of indigenous people in the country.  A Newspoll survey from 
early 2000 indicated that fifty-two percent of Australians did not believe that 
Aboriginals were disadvantaged.  However, ‘disadvantage’ is found by all 
measurements of living standards – life expectancy, children’s health, 
educational attainment, poverty levels, unemployment – which characterises 
the indigenous community as a third-world nation living in the midst of one of 
the richest Western societies (Grattan 2000: 180). 
 
The HREOC Social Justice Report 2000 notes that the two most important 
issues to be addressed in Australia are the lack of recognition and respect for 
indigenous culture and values, and the persistent imbalance of power 
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between indigenous and non-indigenous people.  Landlessness, poverty, and 
socio-economic disadvantage render many indigenous people incapable or 
unable to participate fully in Australian society.  A significant imbalance in 
these areas is also found between white and black people in South Africa.  
Thus, despite the apparent success in the South African reconciliation 
process relative to Australia, there is very little difference in the practical living 
conditions for traditionally oppressed groups between the two countries. 
 
The HREOC Social Justice Report 2000 poses the following question: Will 
Australia seize the opportunity to challenge the fundamental contradiction that 
lies at the heart of their society?  While modern day Australia prides itself on 
being a defender of human rights and a model democracy, it is a historical 
fact that it is a nation built on the exploitation and dispossession of Aboriginals 
and Torres Strait Islanders.  According to the Social Justice Report 2000, the 
reconciliation process challenges Australia to structurally adapt in ways that 
welcome, respect, and encourage the participation of indigenous people in 
society.  Integral to forging this new relationship is the recognition of past 
wrongs and a new respect for the human rights and dignity of all people. 
 
Boraine (2000) argues that while truth facilitates reconciliation it does not 
necessarily guarantee it.  Exposing difficult or unpalatable historical truth 
encourages victims and survivors to come to terms with past, and to reclaim 
their lives from the effects of uncertainty and loss of dignity (Boraine 2000: 
376).  The TRC report suggested that its work had uncovered enough of the 
truth about South Africa’s past to begin building a consensus on the common 
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history of the country.  While truth is often divisive, it is essential for true 
reconciliation to occur (TRC Report 1998).  Du Toit (2003) suggests that 
reconciliation can be problematic if it is predicated on every person learning to 
forgive in order to participate.  Rather, forgiveness should be considered a 
consequence of rather than a pre-requisite for the reconciliation process (Du 
Toit 2003: 301).  
 
Du Toit (2003) offers an argument that allows us to look to the future in ways 
that no other commentators do. He argues that estrangement over past and 
current injustices continues to plague relations between groups in South 
Africa. He identifies a number of blockages to any kind of reconciliation or 
consensus from emerging between groups.  Despite some modest progress 
made through the TRC, Du Toit (2003) contends that a lack of historical 
common ground still exists, and establishing such a consensus is an essential 
component of releasing trauma and learning to live together (Du Toit 2003: 
134). He also posits a lack of a geographical common ground as a problem 
since the settlement period in South Africa.  The legacy of the apartheid era  
residential segregation policies restrictions is that most communities are still 
defined along racial lines.  Moreover, rising crime rates have renewed 
attempts by affluent South Africans to isolate themselves from the majority of 
the population (Du Toit 2003: 134). 
 
Du Toit (2003) suggests a third lacunae - a lack of cultural common ground, 
usually expressed in the heated public debates over multi-culturalism and 
non-racialism, has also impeded reconciliation.  Neither notion appears to 
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offer a solution for a society defined so completely by racial classification.  Du 
Toit’s (2003) view is that South Africans will have to develop  new ways of 
dealing with racial and other differences and affiliations.  Du Toit (2003) 
suggests that a great deal remains to be done to convince South Africans that 
cultural ‘strangers’ – in the form of fellow South Africans, immigrants, or 
international partners – can be seen as a resource and not a threat (Du Toit 
2003: 134, 135).  
 
For Du Toit (2003) the past and present ‘estrangement’ also remains an 
important obstacle to reconciliation.  He says ‘creating a dialogue, developing 
a safe middle ground, and fostering mutual appreciation of cultural and 
language differences are a modest starting point towards overcoming 
estrangement’ (Du Toit 2003: 135). This is tied to socio-economic inequality 
which he suggests is an ‘extremely serious obstacle to social reconciliation’ 
(Du Toit 2003: 135).  Over the three-hundred and fify-year history of 
settlement in South Africa, blacks were systematically exploited, oppressed, 
and impoverished, while the white community almost universally benefited.  
However, it must be recognised that this situation cannot be remedied 
immediately (Du Toit 2003: 135).  In addition, Systemic poverty creates 
substantially different living and working environments in South Africa.  
Educational and cultural diversity restricts social discourse as shared topics 
and interests are typically limited.  Unemployment generates enormous 
pressure for those without work, as well as on employed family members.  
Wealthy communities are able to access a substantial range of skills and 
resources, while the poor remain almost wholly dependent on the public 
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sector.  There is seldom any genuine or protracted interaction or consultation 
between these vastly different worlds.  The results of a racist past – 
manifested in conditions of extreme poverty in the present – complicate the 
quest for social reconciliation.  Awareness and sensitivity are crucial elements 
of social reconciliation between rich and poor.  Companies can foster diversity 
by paying careful attention to capacity building and skills development, as well 
as appropriate mentoring (Du Toit 2003: 135).  
 
The final obstacle to reconciliation in Du Toit’s (2003) view, is the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic. He argues that it is a social and economic disaster for 
southern Africa.  Du Toit (2003) draws on projections that suggest that almost 
half of the workforce would be lost because of the AIDS pandemic.    He 
suggests that efforts towards establishing a multi-faceted approach to fighting 
the illness, relying on scientific progress, social development, the alleviation of 
poverty, sex education, personal empowerment, strong leadership, and 
international awareness, is required (Du Toit 2003: 135). 
 
For Du Toit (2003), race remains a core unresolved issue in reconciliation.  
Claims that race is no longer important – or that non-racialism permits 
ignorance of the issue – fosters a culture of denial and unaccountability.  
Conversely, national attempts to raise awareness about racism and address 
instances of racial discrimination and violence have sometimes generated ill 
feeling and racial polarisation.  The challenge is generating constructive 
dialogue about race that balances these tensions (Du Toit 2003: 136).  
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Du Toit (2003) concludes that the final obstacle is to restore the ‘human face’ 
of a society as traumatised and divided as South Africa. He identifies violent 
crime as one of the major blockages to any progress. As he says:  
Violent crime postpones that restoration.  In a society saturated with 
violence to the extent South Africa’s is, people often accept that 
violence is fine as long as you get away with it.  It undermines 
interpersonal trust and tolerance and invades public spaces with 
tension and aggression.  This violent culture – fed and encouraged by 
violent crime – stands in diametrical opposition to a culture of ubuntu 
and human dignity, which is the end goal of a process of reconciliation.  
South Africans have to come to terms with – and effectively prevent - 
the violence in their communities.  We cannot achieve reconciliation as 
long as violence flourishes.  The logic of violence destroys the capacity 
for reconciliation (Du Toit 2003: 137). 
 
Australia faces many of the same obstacles presented above (with the 
exception of the HIV and AIDS in pandemic proportions).  As noted in the 
Chapter 1, Australians were also faced with almost a complete lack of 
historical, geographical, and cultural common ground between the indigenous 
and non-indigenous communities in the country.  Present day indigenous 
communities are characterised by estrangement, socio-economic inequality, 
and systemic poverty.  Racism and violent crime (within Aboriginal 
communities) also continue to be serious obstacles to the reconciliation 
process.  
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The Australian colonial state was built upon the cartographic notion that every 
race could be sorted properly into their own place with indigenous people 
segregated on missions and under the control of Protection Boards.  Those 
who were of ‘mixed descent’ were to be ‘merged’ or ‘assimilated’ into the non-
indigenous community.  Yet this orderly system was always impossible, and 
this impossibility and the anxiety it produced in those who imagined 
themselves as white was at stake in the practices of separation documented 
in the report.  Bureaucrats and missionaries were concerned to maintain racial 
purity – while in South Africa this function was performed by the Immorality 
Squad, in Australia it was performed by the Chief Protectors and child welfare 
agencies who removed children described as ‘half-caste’.  Intimate relations 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people were thus punished.  Yet this 
only complicated the attempt to maintain strict racial boundaries. (Orford 2005: 
10, 11).  
 
‘So while Bringing them Home seeks to make racism a thing of the past, its 
solution to these racist practices is in part to propose an ordering back into 
categories, ensuring that everyone has gone home’ (Orford 2005: 12). 
 
This was precisely the structure that the newly-elected conservative 
Australian government mobilised in its response to the Report.  According to 
Prime Minister John Howard, whose government was elected in 1996 (and 
has been re-elected twice since then, most recently in 2004), the 
Commonwealth government owed no apology for these separation policies 
because ‘Australians of this generation should not be required to accept guilt 
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and blame for past actions and policies over which they had no control’ 
(Orford 2005: 13, 14).  In the media, Howard insisted: ‘I do not believe that 
current generations of Australians should formally apologise and accept 
responsibility for the deeds of an earlier generation’ (Orford 2005: 13, 14).  
Yet the report explicitly sought to derive these obligations from international 
law binding the sovereign state of Australia.  It notes that the international 
legal obligation to make reparation ‘passes from the violating government to 
its successors until satisfaction has been made’ (Orford 2005: 13, 14).  
Orford’s (2005) analysis shows how Howard’s persistent invocation of familial 
rather than legal language works overtly to refuse the notion that obligations 
or debts can be inherited from earlier generations.  It also works implicitly to 
affirm that these ancestors of John Howard and of those he represents are 
not Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander’ (Orford 2005: 13, 14). 
 
Bringing them Home exemplifies the complex commitments required of 
participants in this transitional justice process.  Indigenous peoples are called 
by a national institution representing the universal good of human rights and 
formal equality to testify to their experiences at the hands of the colonial state.  
In exchange, these stories are translated into accounts of rights violations that 
give rise to obligations on the part of the nation-state to make reparations.  An 
economy or closed system of circulation is constituted through the report 
where Indigenous peoples must allow themselves to be spoken in the 
language of human rights and equality for the nation.  They must both be 
represented in this formalist account of the nation and its history, and yet also 
identify with the project of returning home in order to benefit from many of the 
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report’s recommendations.  In this way, the differentiated system is recreated. 
In much the same way, the doctrine of native title developed in Australia 
during the 1990s requires Indigenous peoples to demonstrate an ongoing 
relationship to culture and land if they are to have their property rights 
recognised by the Australian state.  For the non-indigenous addressees of this 
report, it offers the promise of a new ground for the nation-state.  It is not 
possible to imagine that the nation-state of Australia could continue on the 
basis of such a terrible history of dispossession, genocide, grief, loss and 
exploitation.  Yet perhaps, as Orford (2005) opines  ‘if the peoples of the 
nation are reconciled, if debts are paid, if the past is remembered (and 
remembered ‘in this form, writing’), if those who have been denied voice 
become speaking subjects, perhaps then the nation might be able to move 
forward into a future of hope and justice’ (Orford 2005: 16). 
 
Orford (2005) says, ‘There is a promise and a danger in such a project.  The 
promise is realised in the vision of the past that is made available by the 
report.  The need to articulate the universal through the particular – here 
through the testimony of Indigenous witnesses – means that something new 
happens, something that disrupts this circulation of honest words and things’ 
(Orford 2005: 16, 17).  Orford (2005) shows that emerging through the 
testimony of both perpetrators and victims of the  violence of colonialism ‘a 
history of that which escapes the ordered world that colonial administrators 
and bureaucrats imagined they were bringing into being’ (Orford 2005: 16, 17).  
The discourse embedded in the report spells out what Orford (2005) calls the 
‘desires’ that structure relations in a colonial state, ‘the desire to be free of the 
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power of the state to normalise and punish, the desire to be desired by the 
other, the desire to transgress boundaries or borders, the desire to erect or 
affirm boundaries, the desire to name and categorise, the desire for 
reconciliation of private self and public community, the desire to go home’ 
(Orford 2005: 16, 17). 
 
Australian and South African Government Responses to Reconciliation 
 
In Australia, the HREOC Social Justice Report 2002 argues that despite 
Prime Minister John Howard identifying reconciliation as a key priority during 
his second term, the government did not focus on the issue nor articulated 
any strategic plan.  This ‘blind spot’ in the Australian government’s vision of 
an all-inclusive civil society had far-reaching implications for indigenous 
people.  Dr William Jonas, an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commissioner and author of the Social Justice Report, contended that the 
Australian government moved towards addressing issues that were marginal 
to indigenous people at the expense of sustained work on the distinct 
problems already identified (Social Justice Report 2002). 
  
Dr Jonas noted that the government’s response to the CAR documents, which 
were the result of a ten-year investigative process, was far more restrained 
and subdued than expected.  The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
agreed to issue a communiqué on reconciliation adopting only one of the 
CAR’s recommendations.  Apart from this step, there was no formal or 
comprehensive response from the federal government to the reconciliation 
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documents presented at Corroboree 2000, or to the recommendations 
contained in the CAR’s final report of December 2000 (Social Justice Report 
2001: 196). 
 
According to the Social Justice Report 2001, the government had numerous 
specific reservations about the concept of a negotiated and binding treaty:  
We must try to focus as much as possible on those areas where all of 
us agree, and there are many areas of agreement in relation to 
reconciliation.  Those things where we agree are much greater, more 
important, stronger and more enduring than those areas where we 
disagree (Social Justice Report 2001: 197). 
 
For Jonas, this indicated that the government was committed to pursuing only 
its notion of ‘practical reconciliation’. 
 
In South Africa, it was clear with the establishment of the new democratic 
order in 1994 that the government was initially committed to a reconciliation 
process.  The establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was 
the first step and was combined with the enactment of legislation to address 
human rights issues and socio-economic inequalities in the country.  However, 
reconciliation no longer seemed to feature in the government’s plans after the 
report was released. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) tended to replace 
the earlier vision of racial reconciliation in South Africa after Mbeki came to 
power in 1999.   
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International Pressure 
 
Unlike Australia, South Africa faced intense international pressure to end 
apartheid and reform its system of governance.  Du Toit (2003) argues that 
the threat of continued social and economic sanctions, particularly during the 
period of rapid global change following the collapse of the Soviet Union (1990), 
brought the apartheid regime to the negotiating table.  The cumulative impact 
of the international anti-apartheid lobby, international sanctions, Resolution 
556, and various other international instruments pressured South Africa to 
unravel its oppressive race-based system.  These efforts –  
coupled with sustained internal resistance and armed struggle  – led to the 
unbanning of liberation movements and the release of political prisoners on 2 
February 1990, negotiations for a new constitution from 1992 to 1994, and  
democratic elections on 27 April 1994 (Du Toit 2003: 24, 25).  
 
In contrast, Australia faced little international pressure to change its 
relationship to the indigenous population (Interview: Nursey-Bray 2003).  
International involvement was usually limited to expressions of concern from 
United Nations (UN) agencies and human rights committees about medical 
conditions in the bush and the treatment of Aboriginal prisoners.  The UN has 
had very little influence on the conduct of the Australian government, 
particularly since Prime Minister Howard developed close bilateral relationship 
with the United States (Interview: Nursey-Bray 2003).  The response of the 
Australian government to critical comments from human rights committees 
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and the UN has been to express disbelief at the evidence presented or 
challenge the credibility of the investigation process (Interview: Nursey-Bray 
2003). This is in stark contrast to the behaviour and attitude of conservative 
Australian governments of the past, who were far more sensitive to 
international public opinion.   
 
According the Nettheim (2003), the effective mobilisation of international 
pressure against a single country - such as in the case of South Africa under 
apartheid - is very rare.  Australia never had to face this kind of pressure 
(Interview: Nettheim 2003).   
 
Some of the reasons why similar sufferings in Australia were invisible to the 
international community include Australia’s status as one of the wealthiest 
first-world countries, its close ties with other wealthy first world countries and 
the fact that its Aboriginal population is a small minority which does not have a 
strong united voice and has been unable to place the type of pressure on the 
government which was illustrated by the South African liberation movement.  
 
During the South African liberation struggle many political parties, groups, 
newspapers and individuals were banned under the various restricting Acts. 
These groups and individuals often fled the country to continue their struggle 
abroad. This provided an international platform to create awareness about the 
attrocities and violations occuring in South Africa. The Australian situation 
could be considered to be a quiet struggle as the aboriginal people did not 
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have an international voice or the numbers needed to create pressure on the 
government. 
 
Conclusions  
 
In this chapter we identified a variety of obstacles that have impeded the 
success of the formal reconciliation processes, as well as the overall 
achievement of reconciliation in both these societies.  
We have established that these processes would never have overcome the 
deep wounds created by the histories of oppression, however they were, to a 
certain degree, able to lay a foundation for future reconciliation.   
 
Several obstacles were faced, and still face reconciliation in these two 
countries. These include: racism, divisions, stereotyping, recognition of past 
oppression. Further obstacles identified include: lack of historical common 
ground; lack of a geographical common ground; lack of cultural common 
ground; systemic poverty; and violent crime. In the case of South Africa, the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic was also identified as a major obstacle. A central 
obstacles to reconciliation in Australia is the Aboriginals’ fear of assimilation. 
 
We established that the ideal outcome of reconciliation is the creation of a 
new social compact that promotes and balances rights and responsibilities 
against the needs of the wider community, economy, and state. Australia 
prides itself on being a defender of human rights and a model Democracy. 
However, the government was committed to pursuing only its notion of 
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‘practical reconciliation’. In the next chapter we discuss how the debate 
between human rights versus ‘practical reconciliation’ was approached by 
these two countries.  
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CHAPTER  6: HUMAN RIGHTS VERSUS PRACTICAL 
RECONCILIATION 
 
Introduction 
 
Equality, human rights, and socio-economic disadvantage are the defining 
elements of the debate between the government and the indigenous 
community in Australia.  In terms of equality, deciding whether to adopt a 
formal or substantive approach has been the greatest source of contention.  
In South Africa, the debate focussed primarily on incorporating socio-
economic and other substantive rights into the new constitution.  In Australia, 
unlike in South Africa, distinctions were made between different sectoral 
interests.   
 
The distinction between formal rights and substantive rights is central when 
considering equality.  Whether in South Africa or Australia, continuing 
indigenous disadvantage is at the heart of these substantive aspects.  While 
South Africa’s TRC appears to have had more impact in terms of  
acknowledging the human rights abuse of the apartheid era and for some 
victims to move towards reconciliation than in Australia, South Africa is still 
experiencing an equivalent level of indigenous socio-economic disadvantage.  
What is striking about Australia is the fact that there has been little 
improvement for Aborigines.  Australia is one of the wealthiest countries in the 
world, and its indigenous population comprises only two percent of its total 
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population.  In South Africa, wealth is concentrated in clearly delineated 
enclaves, which are inaccessible to the overwhelming majority of the 
population. 
 
This chapter will consider two aspects. First how government spending has 
addressed these realities in both countries.  It will also examine the core issue 
of contention in Australia’s reconciliation debate: human rights issues (or what 
the government refers to as ‘symbolic’ issues) versus ‘practical reconciliation’ 
(dealing with socio-economic disadvantage).  In South Africa, it was clear 
from the outset of the democratic transition that a balance between symbolic 
and practical action was sought on these issues: in other words, between 
acknowledging the past and recompensing the victims.  In Australia, however, 
the government took a  very different approach: the focus was  on addressing 
the ‘practical’ issues of reconciliation.  The government believed that focusing 
on ‘symbolic’ issues was not its responsibility: To do so would mean accepting 
responsibility for past violations committed against indigenous people.  
Essentially, the government believed that existing laws and rights available to 
all other Australian citizens should be adequate for indigenous people as well. 
 
Equality 
 
The 1967 referendum in Australia was a symbolic act of recognition that 
raised the expectation among the indigenous population that a new, inclusive 
relationship with Australian society was beginning.  Indigenous people had 
actively sought symbolic inclusion since the 1960s in the hope that neutral 
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and formal equality would lead to an improvement in their circumstances and 
treatment.  However, it became increasingly evident after the referendum that 
the formal structures and institutions of the country had not changed enough 
to equalise – let alone reverse – the socio-economic impact of colonisation 
and past policies and practices. 
 
The principles of non-discrimination and equality before the law are basic 
democratic concepts.  Yet, there still is no clear understanding in Australian 
civil society as to how these terms relate to the reconciliation process.  
Research conducted by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation found that 
while a strong commitment to ‘equal treatment’ existed across Australian 
society, there were sharply differing views as to the nature and effects of this 
commitment.  A popular view of equality is that people should be treated the 
same.  From this perspective, reconciliation should be about ‘sameness’, and 
not result in different or ‘special’ treatment for either indigenous or non-
indigenous Australians.  At its extreme, this view considers different treatment 
for indigenous people to be a threat to national unity or supportive of a notion 
of ‘separate rights’. 
 
In South Africa, a similar debate about the nature of a post-apartheid rights 
system began as early as the 1950s, with the Freedom Charter. The 
negotiations of the 1990s reflected the reality that thirty years of apartheid had 
redefined the parameters of what ‘human rights’ actually protect: in that case, 
it was formal protections for political, social, economic, and gender rights.  
Thus, the state took reasonable legislative and other measures to achieve the 
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progressive realisation of these rights.  The Bill of Rights, entrenched in the 
South African Constitution, now provides all South Africans with fundamental 
protections, freedoms, and human rights, as well as many socio-economic 
rights.   
 
The Australian federal government reflected this perspective in its response to 
the Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation (2000).  When the CAR 
publicly released the declaration, Prime Minister John Howard released his 
own ‘preferred’ version.  It replaced the wording ‘We desire a future where all 
Australians enjoy their rights, accept their responsibilities, and have the 
opportunity to achieve their full potential’ with: ‘We desire a future where all 
Australians enjoy equal rights, live under the same laws and share 
opportunities and responsibilities according to their aspirations’ .  In a press 
release, the government indicated its ‘reservations about the strategy to 
promote recognition of indigenous rights over and above those enjoyed by 
other Australians’ (Social Justice Report 2000: 18, 19). 
 
This view of equality as a neutral concept, although popular, does not reflect 
reality.  The notion that everybody can be treated exactly the same overlooks 
the simple reality that indigenous people have been consistently discriminated 
against throughout Australian history.  Regarded as racially inferior to 
Europeans, indigenous people were dispossessed, marginalised, and 
excluded from mainstream society.  When they were allowed to participate in 
mainstream society, it was only if they behaved ‘more like white people’.  
Before 1967, indigenous people were not counted as Australians for the 
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purpose of the census, and many were denied the right to vote or refused 
basic entitlements such as welfare (Social Justice Report 2000: 19).  This 
historical failure to provide indigenous people with the same opportunities 
meant that insisting on identical treatment in the 1960s would have simply 
confirmed their position at the bottom of Australian society.  Demands for 
identical or ‘sameness’ of treatment were tantamount to ‘keeping indigenous 
people in their place’ (Social Justice Report 2000). 
 
The Social Justice Report (2000) argued that two factors have to be 
considered in order to facilitate the equal participation of indigenous people in 
Australian society.  First, there has to be an acknowledgement of the 
historically derived nature of indigenous disadvantage, and that remedial 
measures are required to provide indigenous people with equality of 
opportunity.  Such measures are seen as necessary and fair so that 
indigenous people can ‘catch up’.  Second, for indigenous people to be able 
to participate in Australian society as equals, they have to be free from 
external interference in deciding what is best for them.  It also requires 
providing a space for the recognition of their values, culture, and traditions, so 
that they can co-exist with mainstream society while not losing their identity 
(Social Justice Report 2000).   
 
Practical reconciliation sought to address indigenous concerns on a basis of 
restrictive equality.  Ultimately, it was perceived as assimilationist, aiming for 
formal equality with only limited recognition of cultural difference.  It sought to 
maintain rather than transform the relationship of indigenous people to 
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mainstream Australian society (Social Justice Report 2001: 205).  The limited 
equality offered by the practical reconciliation approach was reflected in the 
government’s response to the final report of the Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation. As noted by Prime Minister John Howard: 
And whatever may be our different perspectives and the different views 
we might hold as to how to achieve our goals, I believe it can be said 
with total sincerity and total accuracy that there is, within the Australian 
community, a great deal of good will towards the indigenous people of 
our nation; …a determination to bring about those changes in the 
circumstances of their education, their health, their employment and 
their housing opportunities that will enable this country in the fullness of 
time to say that in relation to each of their citizens and to each of the 
groups that make up the Australian community that all are receiving a 
fair go; that all are sharing in the Australian dream and all are in every 
sense of the word full and equally part of the great Australian nation 
(Social Justice Report 2001: 205, 206).  
 
This form of equality promotes opportunities for participation in mainstream 
Australia on the basis of ‘sameness’.  A substantive equality approach 
necessitates acknowledgement of the impact of historically derived 
disadvantage, and involves measures that are both culturally appropriate and 
responsive to the inequity already experienced by indigenous people.  
Moreover, the terms of equal participation set out above do not allow for the 
recognition of the inherent uniqueness and diversity of indigenous values, 
traditions, and culture.  The ‘fair go’ was restricted to an offer to participate in 
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the existing mainstream system, rather than exhibiting willingness for that 
system to adapt or accommodate indigenous cultural distinctiveness.  This 
notion of equal participation combines all perspectives into one unifying 
‘Australian dream’, thus obscuring the need for the specific recognition of 
indigenous social and racial identity.  Essentially, this response halted the 
dialogue between indigenous and non-indigenous people that was envisaged 
as an essential part of the reconciliation process.   
 
According to the Bringing Them Home report: 
Reconciliation cannot be imposed on one party by the other.  It cannot 
be achieved when there is little or no consultation between the parties 
or when they adopt a “take it or leave it” approach to the terms of their 
reconciliation.  Participation on equal terms and the full agreement of 
both parties are essential to genuine reconciliation (Social Justice 
Report 2001: 207).  
On it is own, formal equality is not enough of a solution.  Formal equality 
would be inadequate as an instrument of social change, and would likely 
further entrench existing inequalities.  The problem is not simply that 
Aboriginals should be given equal rights and treated like everyone else; it is 
that formal rights would be the only rights given to Aboriginals.  Australia 
needs to adopt a rights approach that has the capacity to transform the 
existing social, economic, and political relationship of indigenous people to 
society (Social Justice Report 2001: 218).  There are consequences to 
establishing a system of ‘differentiated citizenship’.  However, using such a 
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measure is necessary to right the historical wrongs of colonialism and 
dispossession and achieve reconciliation (Social Justice Report 2001). 
 
Similar arguments about restitutive justice were offered in South Africa.  After 
1994, the new government pursued a comprehensive equality and affirmative 
action legislative programme aimed at addressing the legacy of apartheid and 
traditional discrimination against blacks, women, and the disabled in various 
areas (e.g., employment, land rights, etc.).  The Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000 (Act 4 of 2000) required every 
level of government to implement equality measures and forced the repeal of 
any remaining law, policy, or practice that perpetuated inequality. 
 
In contrast, the call to abandon certain rights claims in the Australian 
reconciliation process implies that such an approach has been tried and it has 
failed.  The Social Justice Report (2001) suggests that Aboriginals be given 
special rights through native title and other measures, but it has never been 
considered to be a realistic option by the government  (Social Justice Report 
2001: 219). 
 
Indigenous Disadvantage and Indigenous-Specific Expenditure  
 
Few countries are as infamous as South Africa for its contrasting extravagant 
wealth and luxury, and extreme poverty and destitution.  In terms of the total 
population, inequality is growing within each racial category and now exhibits 
a distinct class-based character.  
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Professor Sampie Terreblanche (2002) suggests that even accounting for 
South Africa’s colonial history, unemployment, poverty, inequality, violence, 
and criminality are problems with an indisputable structural or systemic 
character.  These problems have been shaped and ‘created’ over an 
extended period by the power structures that formed the basis of colonialism, 
segregation, and apartheid (Terreblanche 2002: 26).  He suggests that these 
problems are neither incidental nor temporary in nature.   For Terreblanche 
(2002), ‘A proper diagnosis of the true nature and root causes of these 
problems would be a precondition for any attempt to solve them or to 
ameliorate their negative and humiliating effects’ (Terreblanche 2002: 26).   
 
There is a range of concerns about the ‘practical measures’ approach 
employed in determining indigenous-specific expenditures in Australia.  The 
first problem is the government’s definition of ‘indigenous-specific’, which is 
extremely broad and can include everything from funding the Federal Court 
and National Native Tribunal to processing native title applications (including 
those made by non-indigenous parties) to general community initiatives 
relating to reconciliation and the National Museum of Australia.  In other 
words, it could potentially involve any expenditure even remotely associated 
to indigenous people or indigenous issues, regardless of the specificity of the 
relationship or the benefit that it provides (e.g., some funding identified as 
indigenous-specific was clearly detrimental to the advancement of indigenous 
people). 
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This overly broad funding practice also misrepresents the actual cost of 
indigenous programs, which could be used as political fodder in public 
debates on reconciliation and indigenous affairs.  The Social Justice Report 
(2001) argues that it is inappropriate to measure government progress in 
redressing indigenous disadvantage in these terms: An outcomes-based 
focus would be far more appropriate (Social Justice Report 2001: 209).  
Specific or specialist programs are ‘designed to compensate for the 
disadvantage and particular needs of indigenous people – which stem from 
where they live, degree of poverty and particular aspects of their history or 
culture.  But, while indigenous-specific programs are often strategic and 
targeted, they are not in a position to replicate the level of services and 
expertise provided by mainstream programs, such as specialist hospital 
services’ (Social Justice Report 2001: 209).   
 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission’s (CGC) (2001) Report on 
Indigenous Funding found that indigenous-specific programs are required to 
do more than they were designed and funded to achieve because of the 
failure of mainstream programs to address indigenous needs effectively 
(Social Justice Report 2001: 209).  Accordingly, the CGC report identified 
equity of access to mainstream programs for indigenous people to be the 
highest priority for a government seeking to reduce indigenous disadvantage 
(Social Justice Report 2001: 209). 
 
From a substantive equality perspective, the supplementary funding provided 
for reconciliation projects was meagre, particularly in the absence of a long-
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term nationally coordinated framework that could present an effective 
negotiated outcome.  Aboriginals are faced with the continuation of an 
approach that ‘manages’ rather than seeks to overcome indigenous 
disadvantage and marginalisation. A significant component of the 
government’s approach to reconciliation was its reference to record levels of 
expenditure on indigenous affairs.  However, this additional funding still falls 
substantially short of the funds needed to meet outstanding deficits across a 
range of key areas.  
 
While a commitment to overcome indigenous disadvantage was the only 
major point of agreement between the government and indigenous leaders 
concerning reconciliation, it did not follow that there was common acceptance 
of the practical reconciliation approach.  This was a rhetorical ‘slight-of-hand’ 
on the part of the government, which indicated their general unwillingness to 
adequately consult or engage indigenous people in a dialogue about 
reconciliation.  This is a trademark of the government’s ‘take it or leave it 
approach’ to reconciliation, which inherently implies that indigenous people 
are dependent on the benevolence of government, and indicates an 
abhorrence to establishing a partnership based on consultation and 
consensus.   
 
The Australian government’s attitude was that past cultural conflict and 
unsympathetic policy-making had been instrumental in establishing a ‘welfare 
mentality’ and entrenching socio-economic disparity.  ‘This led to a culture of 
dependency and victimhood, which condemned many indigenous Australians 
  
 
132 
to lives of poverty and further devalued their culture in the eyes of their fellow 
Australians’ (Behrendt 2003: 11).  For Prime Minister Howard, the main issues 
were the development of dependency, victimhood, and poverty. He believed 
that these problems could be addressed by a more benevolent legislature 
according to the advocates of practical reconciliation (Behrendt 2003: 11).   
 
Past government policies and practices, such as child removal, have 
contributed substantially to the present socio-economic inequalities and 
systemic racism experienced by indigenous communities.  The Kruger case - 
the first ‘Stolen Generations’ suit brought before the High Court - illustrated 
that these problems have been compounded by the absence of a rights 
framework that might prevent unfair and racist policy-making in the future 
(Behrendt 2003: 11). 
 
Although it frequently claims that money is not the solution to indigenous 
problems, the government tends to trumpet the amount of expenditures in 
these areas without analysing whether the money actually provides a 
substantial benefit.  The consequence of failing to attend to broader long-term 
structural goals is to confine the government’s activities to reactive policy-
making. 
 
Behrendt’s (2003) view is that practical reconciliation does not attack the 
systemic and institutionalised impediments to socio-economic development.  
Simply put, the government has failed to address the issues at the heart of 
historical and institutional racism, or to recognise the need for the tangible 
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protection of indigenous rights, including economic and property rights.  The 
recognition and protection of these rights would have put land under people’s 
feet, allowed access to natural and other economic resources, and helped 
indigenous communities become economically self-sufficient (Behrendt 2003: 
11). 
 
Increased social spending on the poor represents a considerable 
redistribution of income from whites to blacks in South Africa.  Nevertheless, 
Terreblance (2002) suggests that the structural dynamics in a situation of 
disrupted social structures, growing unemployment, poor health conditions, 
and increasing violence and criminality are such that the quality of life of the 
poorer section of the population has deteriorated considerably in the post-
apartheid period.  The legacy of colonialism, segregation, and apartheid has 
been far more difficult to overcome in the context of globalisation than was 
realised in 1994.  The restructuring of the public sector mainly served the 
interests of whites, and redirecting public spending towards blacks, especially 
the poor, was enormously difficult (Terreblanche 2002: 28, 29). 
 
The TRC strongly recommended that the government accelerate the closing 
of the extreme gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged in South 
Africa.  It suggested urgent attention for the transformation of education, the 
provision of shelter, access to clean water and health services, and the 
creation of job opportunities.  The recognition and protection of socio-
economic rights were seen as crucial to the development and sustainability of 
a culture of human rights and equality (Boraine 2000: 357).  
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The TRC argued that the public sector alone could deliver economic justice.  
The Commission indicated the important role that the private sector should 
play in funding and providing training and economic opportunities for the 
disadvantaged and dispossessed (Boraine 2000: 357).   The TRCs view was 
that reconciliation without economic justice would be unworkable and 
unrealistic (Boraine 2000: 357). 
 
Human Rights versus Practical Reconciliation 
 
It is impossible to talk meaningfully about reconciliation - and the 
transformation in relationships between indigenous and non-indigenous 
people that it seeks - without reference to human rights.  The preamble to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: ‘Recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace’ (Social Justice Report 
2000: 17). Both the South African and Australian processes were defined in 
terms of human rights. Both were about rewriting who was a subject of ‘the 
nation’. In the South African case, the settling of the past was easy to confront 
– it was so clearly cast in racial terms.  However, the individualisation of 
abuse masked the systematic and systemic nature of apartheid. The 
Australian process was also about settling abuses of the past – it was also 
cast in individualistic terms. However, instead of providing a process that 
might incorporate Aborigines into the new nation, the manner in which it 
addressed the past simply redefined Aboriginal identity in terms that kept it 
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outside the nation. The major concerns of the first peoples were simply 
ignored. Where were they to come home to, if it was not to be their land? 
Thus, if in Australia the concerns of the Aboriginal peoples was to be 
addressed, it would have required reversing their historical (land) and current 
(welfare and health) inequalities. The material aspects of citizenship, in terms 
of increased accountability and transparency in relation to indigenous policies 
required a focus on the effective participation of indigenous communities in 
service delivery and policy development; and the adequate protection of the 
human rights of indigenous people. 
 
The prohibition of unfair discrimination in South Africa’s interim Constitution 
sought far more than to prevent discrimination against members of 
disadvantaged groups; at its heart was the recognition that the purpose of 
South Africa’s new democratic order was the establishment of a society in 
which all human beings were accorded equal dignity, and to prevent unfair or 
racist policy-making in the future.  The adoption of the final draft of the 
constitution in 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) was a milestone for human rights in 
South Africa.  The preamble states that the constitution was supposed to: 
 
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights; lay the foundations for 
a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of 
the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; improve the quality 
of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and build a united 
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and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign 
state in the family of nations (RSA 1996: 3). 
 
The economic and social rights recognised in the Constitution include: labour 
rights; the right to an environment that is not harmful to health or well-being; to 
protect the environment through reasonable legislative and other measures 
that secure sustainable development; equitable access to land; security of 
land tenure; restitution of property or equitable redress for property that was 
dispossessed after 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices; right of access to adequate housing and a prohibition on the 
arbitrary eviction of people from their homes or the demolition of homes; right 
of access to health care services (including reproductive health care); access 
to sufficient food and water; access to social security; the right against the 
refusal of emergency medical treatment; the right of children to basic nutrition, 
shelter, health care, and social services; educational rights; and adequate 
accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment at state 
expense for persons deprived of their liberty. 
 
Many of the divisions that emerged in Australia – whether from the 
government’s refusal to overturn mandatory sentencing policies, its response 
to forcible removal policies, its reaction to criticism from the United Nations, or 
its response to calls for the negotiation of a treaty – involved active attempts 
by the federal government to downplay the significance of human rights in 
resolving Australia’s indigenous affairs problems (Social Justice Report 2000: 
2).  This approach has also relied efforts to de-legitimise a human rights 
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discourse and to promote the notion that democracy begins and ends with 
majority rule.  Democracy means far more than such a limited interpretation: It 
also requires compliance with the rule of law and the principles of basic 
fairness and equality.  It is also intimately related to the notion of responsible 
government: that government is there to protect the freedom of all sectors of 
society, including the vulnerable and minorities.   
 
According to Thomas Fleiner, ‘democracy and freedom are Siamese twins.  
The one cannot exist without the other’.  In this respect, human rights are the 
‘bedrock’ on which democracy is built (Social Justice Report 2000: 2). 
Indigenous activists have argued that their human rights must be fully 
recognised in order for them to fully participate in Australian society.  This 
requires that a strenuous effort be made to overcome indigenous 
disadvantage: to facilitate indigenous participation in such efforts and to 
promote indigenous governance; to put in place stronger mechanisms to 
prevent future breaches of the human rights of indigenous people; and to 
ensure increased accountability of governments in policy making from a 
human rights perspective. 
 
‘Practical reconciliation’ emphasises the importance of addressing indigenous 
disadvantage in key areas of health, housing, employment, and education.  
Making progress in these areas is certainly crucial to meaningful reconciliation.  
Yet, what ‘practical reconciliation’ also does is to conceive of these four 
priority areas as the ‘real issues’, while representing other concerns such as 
the recognition of rights to land and culture and self-determination as 
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‘symbolic’ and lacking practical benefit.  ‘Practical reconciliation’ has been 
used to limit debate about the importance of addressing disadvantage based 
on rights; by characterising them as a symbolic or emotional objective, they 
were depicted as being disconnected or a distraction from the ‘real’ issues of 
reconciliation.   
 
The result of this approach is to construct an impression that indigenous 
people should be – or are - subject to the beneficence and good intentions of 
government.  This certainly does not change the unequal basis of the 
relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous people, thereby 
disempowering indigenous people in the process. 
 
The government’s primary response to questions about the future of 
indigenous policy in recent years has been a stated commitment to a 
‘practical reconciliation’ approach that addresses ‘key priority’ areas of 
disadvantage.  This approach has continued independently of and without 
reference to or assessment against the recommendations of the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation (Social Justice Report 2001: 205). 
 
The problem is that this approach creates a simplistic, arbitrary, and artificial 
division between measures that are described as ‘practical’ and those 
considered ‘symbolic’.  In reality, no such clear distinction exists: the obvious 
relationships that exist between these different issues and approaches require 
multi-dimensional solutions.  The focus on addressing disadvantage only 
through ‘practical’ measures is far too narrow.  Moreover, this practical 
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approach is not accompanied by any sufficient accountability of government 
performance.  Inadequate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, the lack of 
sufficient benchmarks or targets, and an insufficient basis for program delivery 
characterises the entire process.  Similarly, it does not provide indigenous 
people with a central role in determining their own priorities.  Most significantly, 
the approach dismisses human rights as irrelevant (Social Justice Report 
2001: 205). 
 
This lack of participation on equal terms is evident in the dismissive approach 
the government has adopted by refusing to address what it terms the 
‘symbolic’ aspects of reconciliation.  Indeed, the list of symbolic issues that fall 
outside the government’s interest keeps increasing: It includes an apology 
and reparations for those forcibly removed from their families, a treaty, and 
the facilitation of agreement-making processes to deal with the unfinished 
business of reconciliation. 
 
One of the main concerns expressed by the Social Justice Report (2001) was 
that this approach clearly misconceives or misrepresents the purpose of a 
number of initiatives.  Agreement-making processes and a treaty are not 
symbolic measures, but represent a fundamental realignment of the 
relationship between indigenous people and the state.  They are also about 
ensuring the effective participation of indigenous people in decision-making 
processes in the broadest possible way, rather than within boundaries 
imposed without negotiation (Social Justice Report 2001: 207). 
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In Australia, there was a distinction to be made between two types of rights 
with regard to indigenous people.  First were those rights that every Australian 
is entitled to, and second were those that recognise and protect indigenous 
culture and which are inherent to indigenous people.  This important 
distinction has not been made in the Australian government’s generalised 
attack on the rights approach as inadequate to deal with, if not causally 
related to, the high levels of violence perpetrated by indigenous people 
against their own families and communities.  
 
The government condemns the rights approach as symbolic and incapable of 
producing practical results.  It argues that symbolic rights should be 
distinguished from practical outcomes; practical outcomes, however, result 
from dealing with indigenous issues on an individualistic basis. 
 
An analysis of the arguments offered in opposition to a rights approach to 
indigenous issues indicates that this perspective fails to distinguish between 
the two relevant types of rights: citizenship rights and inherent rights.  What 
were actually damaged in some indigenous communities were the rights that 
came with equal citizenship.  That is, the right of Aboriginals to be treated the 
same as non-Aboriginals without being discriminated against on the basis of 
race.  These included the right to leave a mission or reserve without first 
seeking permission, the right to vote, the right to unemployment benefits, the 
right to enter a de facto relationship, the right to formal equality, and even the 
right to do something as basic as enter a pub and buy alcohol.  (Social Justice 
Report 2001: 218). 
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However, none of those attacking the rights approach suggests that the 
solution would be to take these rights away and force Aboriginals back to 
missions or reserves under the supervision of the Crown, the police, or 
religious organisations.  Such a move would strike at the very core of 
Australian society, as well as marginalise Aboriginal communities even further.  
Advocacy arguments suggest that these rights do not need to be abandoned, 
but they do need to be augmented.  The real problem with citizenship rights is 
that they are incapable of alleviating the poverty and destitution that 
characterises the lives of so many Aboriginals.  Simply put, they were not 
intended for such a purpose (Social Justice Report 2001: 218). Instead, The 
government’s ‘practical reconciliation’ approach was characterised by the 
following assumptions a minimalist response to the symbolic issues raised in 
the CAR reconciliation documents; a perception that self-determination was 
divisive; an emphasis on perceived areas of agreement at the expense of 
continuing debate on other areas; and a misrepresentation of progress made 
towards meeting the goals of practical reconciliation (Social Justice Report 
2002: 78). 
 
The Australian government believes that a continuing dialogue on the 
‘unfinished business’ of reconciliation on matters such as rights, self-
determination within the life of the nation, and constitutional reform should be 
achieved outside a legislated process.  Whatever community support there 
may be for a written declaration of goals and values, the Council’s public 
opinion research indicated strong community opposition to the idea of a treaty 
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that can be legally enforced (such as those made between sovereign states).  
A number of Aboriginal leaders have also recently voiced concerns about the 
relevance, effectiveness, and importance of such an instrument. The 
government is deeply concerned that rather than offering closure, the pursuit 
of a treaty would act as a source of continual dispute and litigation, similar to 
that witnessed in North America and elsewhere (Social Justice Report 2002: 
79). 
 
There is evidence of widespread disagreement between the aspirations of 
some indigenous people and the wider community.  The government 
maintains that it is committed to a process that fosters an open, honest, and 
ongoing dialogue on reconciliation.  This process must respect the rights and 
differing views of all of the interested parties, while also fostering on-going 
and increased support for reconciliation based on the principle of equal and 
common rights for all Australians. 
 
A bill of rights or special constitutional provisions are not supported by the 
government because it ‘strongly believes that the best guarantee of 
fundamental human rights in this country is to have a vigorous and open 
political system, an incorruptible judicial system, and a free press’ (Social 
Justice Report 2002: 81). The government also states that it is committed to 
the protection of ‘the rights of all its citizens, and in particular its indigenous 
peoples, by recognising international standards for the protections of universal 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’ through ratification of the ICERD, 
the ICESCR and the ICCPR, as well as its acceptance of the Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights (Social Justice Report 2002: 81).  The 
government maintains that the Racial Discrimination Act (RDA) provides 
sufficient protection for race rights without the need for further reinforcement 
through constitutional change or the creation of a bill of rights (Social Justice 
Report 2002: 81).   
 
However, while the RDA embodies the principles for the elimination of race 
discrimination set out in the ICERD, it became clear during the late 1990s that 
it still did not provide adequate protection for the exercise of indigenous rights 
within the Australian legal system.  Since 1999, three separate international 
human rights committees have expressed concern about breaches of 
indigenous people’s human rights. What are they? Despite this notification, 
nothing has changed.  Native title issues are still governed by the same legal 
structure that caused the CERD Committee to list Australia under its Urgent 
Action procedure in 1998 and to request an explanation for the imposition of 
this discriminatory policy (Social Justice Report 2002: 81). 
 
Tension exists between the concept of practical reconciliation and the 
development of mechanisms that protect recognised human rights (i.e., a 
rights framework).  The link between economic issues and rights issues is not 
being recognised.  The notion of practical reconciliation is antagonistic to a 
broader rights framework because they are a set of policies that only react to 
emerging problems, and in doing so, ignore the long-term structural and 
institutional changes that can protect rights (Behrendt 2003: 9). 
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Grassroots issues that affect indigenous people on a day-to-day basis – 
violence against women, child sexual abuse, systemic poverty, lack of access 
to services, substance abuse, and high youth suicide rates – must be 
addressed, but it should be done in conjunction with, not in the absence of, a 
broader framework for institutional change. 
 
By the end of the 1990s, it was clear that ‘reconciliation’ had assumed two 
competing meanings.  In one vision, that held by the nation’s unity would be 
predicated on the elimination of ‘difference’ between indigenous and other 
Australians.  In the competing view, ‘reconciliation’ would enact and enshrine 
the different ways that indigenous and non-indigenous Australians ‘belonged’ 
to Australia.  
 
In the South African case, the country  must also deal with the issue of 
eradicating difference. It has attempted to do so by constituting a single 
citizenship that acknowledges the differential opportunities vested in past 
racial preference by establishing the principle of equity and affirmative action. 
That is expressed in the Constitution itself, and does not argue for a 
undifferentiated practice of citizenship.   Although the ANC government has 
not been able thus far to eradicate the legacy of colonialism, segregation, and 
apartheid, it has introduced several laws aimed at laying the foundations for a 
non-racial society.  While the government should be commended for this 
progress, it will be impossible to create a non-racial South Africa as long as 
the vast wealth gap between black and white remains intact, and the 
government continually fails to alleviate poverty or improve the existing 
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economic structure.  Even with the legal foundations for a non-racial society, 
South Africa still has a huge task ahead in ridding itself of racial prejudices.  
However, an important indicator of change is that South Africa has been 
willing to acknowledge reconciliation in law and policy.   
 
In a communiqué to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
summit of 2001, the South African government stated:  
Since racial inequality in South Africa is not a set of isolated 
aberrations that can be corrected by the equal application of the law, or 
the re-education of pathological individuals, it is not sufficient to simply 
tamper with or reform the system.  It requires instead the complete and 
progressive transformation of society (Department of Foreign Affairs 
2001).   
 
In Australia, the articulation of policies to eradicate the gap of difference is far 
more complicated.  The liberal democratic state was not in transition, as was 
the case in South Africa. There was an assumption, that it would be 
discriminatory to ordinary citizens to introduce special mechanisms to assist 
the Aborigines.  One answer suggests that the starting point is acknowledging 
that indigenous people are different from other Australians, but also notes that 
these differences are primarily manifested in ways that bring shame to the 
country.  This response seriously considers the reality that indigenous people 
are by all possible measurements disadvantaged (e.g., employment, income, 
health, education levels, etc).  To alleviate this disadvantaged status, 
governments must devise special programs, many of which should be 
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delivered by indigenous agencies.  The intended effect of these programs is 
to allow indigenous people to ‘catch up’ with non-indigenous Australians.  In 
principle, when the social indicators show equality of well being between 
indigenous and other Australians, these special programs will no longer be 
necessary.  This perspective has an honourable lineage in the Australian 
public policy debate.  Some advocates of the ‘Yes’ vote in the 1967 
referendum hoped that when the Commonwealth acquired power over 
Aboriginal affairs its policies would positively discriminate between Aboriginal 
and other Australians to deal effectively with the disadvantage of the former.  
Reducing ‘disadvantage’ is the basic task of what the Howard government 
has termed ‘practical reconciliation’ (Rowse 2002: 2, 3). 
 
The alternative view is that ‘practical reconciliation’ is not nearly enough.  In 
this perspective, indigenous Australians are a colonised people who remain 
‘different’ from post-1788 immigrants, primarily evidenced by language and 
the imagery of their Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander identities.  Insofar as 
Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders remain distinct ‘peoples’, governments 
should concede to them the right to look after their own affairs and to practice 
self-determination.  Part of that work is devising indigenous solutions to the 
problems of ‘disadvantage’.  Regardless of whether it takes a long or a short 
time to relieve this disadvantage, these indigenous structures must be 
entrenched in the machinery of Australian government.  This can be achieved 
by recognising indigenous regional authorities (and securing a share of public 
revenue for their use), and by negotiating some kind of framework agreement 
(covering land tenure, public revenue, and other substantive issues) between 
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the various Australian governments and representatives of indigenous people.  
Some people would call this agreement a ‘treaty’.  The Senate took this idea 
sufficiently seriously in 1981 to ask its Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs to examine the legal feasibility of such a document.  The 
High Court’s judgments in Mabo (1992) and Wik (1996) have been taken by 
some to imply that indigenous people retain a substantial measure of 
unextinguished sovereignty that should be acknowledged in a treaty and 
practically embodied in the design of their public institutions (Rowse 2002: 3). 
 
These two contrasting responses to Australia’s colonial legacy are linked to 
contrasting ways of thinking about Australian public policy (Rowse 2002: 3). 
 
Exploring indigenous visions of equality, inclusion, and autonomy permit a re-
conceptualisation of the approaches available to better protect indigenous 
rights.  This means, as a starting point, exploring what indigenous political 
aspirations encompass.  What is it that indigenous people need?  Engaging in 
a public dialogue with (rather than about) Aboriginal people is a relatively 
recent approach to policy-making, so it is not surprising that many non-
indigenous people are unfamiliar with the political aspirations of indigenous 
people and their communities. 
 
Two political goals seem ubiquitous in indigenous expression of their political 
aspirations: claims for the recognition of ‘Aboriginal sovereignty’ and ‘self-
determination’.  The key to understanding the indigenous political agenda is to 
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define what it is that Aboriginal people are describing when they employ such 
terms. 
 
A deconstruction of these terms reveals a different political agenda from 
‘sovereignty’ as it is used in an international legal context.  ‘Sovereignty’ and 
‘self-determination’ need to be defined in an indigenous context so that the 
proper parameters of the debate – and their relationship to rights - are 
understood in Australia.  Autonomy is defined within the state coupled with 
inclusion through substantive equality; respect for individual identity is seen in 
tandem with the protection of group identity (Behrendt 2003: 18, 19). 
 
Once the rights sought by indigenous people have been clearly articulated, 
finding ways to recognise indigenous aspirations becomes the next challenge.  
It is therefore necessary to look at what is contained within these claims of 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘self-determination’ and then, from this deconstruction, to 
develop experimental democratic programs that will assist in making those 
aspirations realisable (Behrendt 2003: 19). 
 
When deciphering the notion of ‘Aboriginal sovereignty’, it becomes apparent 
that many of the common international implications of the term are absent; 
moreover, many of the elements that are included in the claim are also rights 
that should already be protected and recognised under existing Australian law.  
They are rights that are recognised as fundamental, either within Australian 
law or within international instruments ratified by Australia (Behrendt 2003: 
19). 
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It is here again that the lesson learned from the ‘Tent Embassy’ should be 
reiterated: a program of piecemeal, episodic changes has not taken 
indigenous people to a stage where they enjoy the same rights as other 
Australians.  Another approach, one that challenges the institutions of 
Australian society and their entrenched biases, needs to be examined.  
Strategies for the better protection of indigenous rights must seek to 
implement a process of institutional change; in order to achieve this, it is 
necessary to expose and erode the dominant, seemingly neutral, ideological 
base of institutional frameworks.  Without accompanying institutional change, 
indigenous people will be frustrated with the critique and be left wanting 
practical outcomes and the achievement of visionary aims (Behrendt 2003: 
19). 
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CHAPTER  7: CONCLUSION 
 
‘Reconciliation cannot be made of concrete if it lacks the binding mortar of 
truth’ – Patrick Dodson (2000) 
 
In considering the main question explored in this thesis, the aim was to define 
the field and consider the content and processes of the discourse of truth and 
reconciliation in the two countries, as well as to analyse the interaction 
between the ‘victims’ and the state.  An important question considered in the 
dissertation was how these truth seeking and reconciliation processes 
compare.  The dissertation attempted to addresses the various issues of 
reconciliation, but also focused on the viability of a human rights-based versus 
a ‘practical reconciliation’ process.  
 
In this dissertation, we compared the  two institutions and processes as well 
as their context (colonial history, policy towards indigenous people, post-
colonial history, demography etc.). Thus,  this was a combination of 
addressing the comparison via case studies of two post-colonial societies, 
and the way they have dealt with that post-colonial history.  
 
The following variables were identified at the outset: Colonial Conquest; 
Protection and Segregation; Assimilation - The Destruction of Indigenous 
Identity; Liberal Constitutionalism and the Struggles for Recognition; Land and 
its Implications; Establishment, Construction and Aims of the Processes; 
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Strengths and Limitations of the Processes; Government Responses to 
Reconciliation; International Pressure; Equality; Human Rights versus 
Practical Reconciliation. 
 
Drawing a comparison between the Australian and South African 
reconciliation processes may seem to some to be incomparible. Australia, 
after all, is an ‘ordinary’ liberal democracy, and not a transitional society like 
South Africa. The oppression of indigenous people in Australia and South 
Africa occurred in different ways, at different times and in different contexts. 
Both countries, however, do share a history of oppression, discrimination and 
the violations of the human rights of their indigenous populations. Hence 
providing a basis for this comparison.  
 
The human rights violations in both these countries were shaped by a colonial 
past which included dispossesion, displacement, disappearances, genocide, 
brutality, oppressive legislation, the loss of identity and a lack of collective 
memory. We can deduce that the ensuing poverty and lack of access to 
opportunities within the respective indigenous communities stem from a 
colonial past.  
 
In both countries racial exclusivism meant that democracy ‘belonged’ only to 
the whites. This lead to an increase in political activism. In Australia, the 
struggles were mainly of a civil nature.  In South Africa, liberation movements 
took up arms against the apartheid regime and a thirty year civil war unfolded. 
A major distinction between the Australian and South African liberation 
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movements was the fact that in South Africa, the oppressed consisted of the 
majority and in Australia, the indigenous population was a small minority. I 
have found that population size is an important variable in mobilising support.  
 
Transition required coming to terms with their pasts and each country, within 
the context of a global human rights movement, developed institutions for 
investigating past violations, establishing the truth, and embarking on a path 
towards reconciliation. South Africa and Australia developed their 
reconciliation processes in this context. The Australian process faced once 
big hurdle in its efforts to come to terms with its past – the Australian 
government. Whereas in South Africa, this process was supported by the 
transitional government. 
 
The view of those involved in the CAR process was that the past should be 
dealt with by an acknowledgement of the atrocities committed against 
indigenous people, recognition of the status and role of indigenous people 
within Australian society, giving Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders their 
outstanding human rights, and providing some form of reparations.  It also 
meant assisting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders in attaining an equal 
socio-economic position with all other Australians. This process, in my view, is 
essential in establishing a new shared history and identity. The only route to 
laying a foundation for a succesful reconciliation process.  The Howard 
government, however, decided that under no circumstances would it take 
responsibility for past injustices against the aboriginal population, offer an 
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apology, or implement any policies relating to reparations, land restitution, or 
a treaty. 
 
 
The Australian government held the position that ‘formal rights’ rather than 
substantive equality was the primary issue, and that it would thus be wrong to 
give any group rights or opportunities not provided to all other citizens - even 
if such an approach would assist in uplifting indigenous people. The 
government insisted on only focusing on ‘practical’ issues relating to 
reconciliation.  Their notion of ‘practical reconciliation’ included providing a 
limited amount of money for housing, unemployment, health, and education, 
believing that anything beyond this narrow interpretation was not their 
responsibility.  Although these ‘practical’ measures are essential in 
establishing equality, I do not see how the road to equality can be paved 
without an acknowlegment of past human rights violations – providing the 
victims a platform for expressing their painful history seems to be useless if 
the findings it produced are not validated by the government.    How does a 
country create a shared history and identity is it refuses to acknowledge its 
history? 
 
South Africa, unlike Australia, chose to deal with reconciliation by redressing 
the issue of past human rights violations as part of formal negotiations for a 
democratic constitution.  Thus, there was an agreed commitment to truth 
telling and acknowledgement of past abuses.  
 
  
 
154 
The approaches of the two governments to the reconciliation processes has 
thus been identified as another important variable in the success of these 
processes. Even though the ultimate goal of these two countries was similar, 
the methods and processes developed by the two countries were completely 
different.   
 
How do the formal reconciliation processes of South Africa and Australia 
compare? The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
determined that reconciliation was not about avoiding the reality of history or 
pretending that events of the past had not occurred.  In South Africa, 
establishing democracy and a human rights culture were essential elements 
of the reconciliation process, with the hope that such changes would foster a 
more decent, caring and just society.   
 
The Australian notion of reconciliation was intended to focus on recognition, 
rights, and reform.  For the Australian government however, reconciliation 
only involved implementing practical measures to achieve improvements in 
the livelihoods of indigenous people.  In this process the focus on creating 
awareness about past human rights violations was avoided and discouraged 
by the government.  Once again, as the indigenous population is a small 
minority in Australia, it was relatively easy for the government to dominate the 
process and place only practical measures on the agenda without the threat 
of a violent uprising.  
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Equality, human rights, and socio-economic disadvantage were defining 
elements of the debate between the governments and the indigenous 
communities. It is impossible to talk meaningfully about reconciliation - and 
the transformation in relationships between indigenous and non-indigenous 
people - without reference to human rights.  Both the South African and 
Australian processes were defined in terms of human rights. Was there in fact 
an increase in the basic human rights of the indigenous people in both these 
countries?  
 
In South Africa, the incorporation of international human rights laws into a 
national constitution was seen as coterminous with democracy, freedom, and 
the creation of a new social contract with citizens. The transition to democracy 
brought constitutional supremacy – a constitution which includes a 
comprehensive bill of rights. In Australia however, the government of the time 
felt that current legislated rights which applied to all other Australians were 
sufficient, even if the provision of additional rights would increase equality 
among all Australians. 
 
The next important question to be addressed regarding the success of these 
processes is: does truth really achieve reconciliation?  In South Africa, 
although the TRC was subjected to much criticism, it was ultimately 
successful in establishing some form of common truth about the human rights 
violations of the apartheid era. The outcome of the formal reconciliation 
process was probably unacceptable for many.  However, in the comparison to 
the Australian process, the TRC achieved more tangible results.   
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It should be noted that the tangible results towards reconciliation in South 
Africa are not attributable only to the TRC.  The new democratic government, 
and especially those involved in creating the country’s new constitution, were 
instrumental in bringing about fundamental change.  The TRC was, in my 
opinion, as successful as it could be in establishing ‘truth’, however the new 
democratic regime bore the brunt of the responsibility of bringing about 
reconciliation in South Africa.   
 
The outcome of the CAR process appears to have been to generate a vicious 
and often counter-productive public debate, and to instigate a continual 
struggle between the government and indigenous and pro-reconciliation 
groups.  The reconciliation debate in Australia has fractured into two 
seemingly intractable perspectives: those who seek practical measures (the 
government who is only prepared to take part in measures relating to 
improving the socio-economic conditions of Aboriginals under particular 
conditions), and those who seek symbolic measures.  One of the wealthiest 
nations in the world has been unwilling and unable to counter the continued 
deterioration of only two percent of its population.  
 
South Africa, too, has struggled to deal with the socio-economic 
disadvantages of its indigenous people. However, South Africa’s success 
relating to ‘practical reconciliation’ - given its resources - has been substantial 
compared to Australia. 
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Although both the South African TRC and the Australian reconciliation 
process achieved much in a short time, ‘real’ reconciliation was not achieved 
in either country.  Until the disadvantages caused by the past are eradicated 
and real economic and social equality is achieved, reconciliation will be 
incomplete.  
 
Research leads me to conclude that in terms of ‘practical reconciliation’, truth, 
and human rights, South Africa has made substantially more progress 
compared to Australia.  For a process that has been ongoing for more than 16 
years, Australia has failed to make any substantial changes to the status of 
indigenous people in their country. 
 
I find that the degree of success of a formal reconciliation processes depends 
largely on the domestic support it receives from the government and the 
public.  In my view, the two reconciliation processes assessed in this 
dissertation have been essential in establishing the truth about and 
awareness of past violations, as well as in the articulation some relatively 
clear reconciliation plans (even if they have not been implemented).  However, 
neither South Africa nor Australia has substantially achieved reconciliation.   
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